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INTEODUCTIDN 
The development of I r a n i a n economy took p l a c e a t a 
r a p i d pace a f t e r t h e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of o i l i n d u s t r y and 
c o n s e q u e n t i a l upsurge of o i l r e v e n u e s . I r an b e a r i n g a 
un ique g e o - p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e forms an i n p o r t a n t b e l t 
in t h e r e g i o n . Country has undergone a marked v a r i a t i o n s 
in p o l i c i e s and p l ann ing fo r economic developmemt. As 
t h e t i t l e s isggests , t h e s tudy i s a modest a t t empt to h igh-
l i g h t t h e main aims and o b j e c t i v e s of I r a n i a n fo re ign p o l i c y 
dur ing t h e p e r i o d 1941 1979. I t c o n c e n t r a t e s on t h e 
s u c c e s s e s and f a i l u r e s of the, p o l i c i e s . The p o l i c y h a s 
su f f e red a heavy se tback in a l l r e s p e c t s , though a t t imes i t 
appeared t h a t i t was ga in ing s l i g h t momentum. 
P r i o r t o t h e Vtorld War I I , I ran was c l o s e l y l i n k e d 
wi th Germany which became m a t t e r of deep concern f o r a l l i e d 
powers p a r t i c u l a r l y Sov ie t Iftiion and Grea t B r i t a i n . Reza 
Shah had to pay t h e c o s t f o r having c l o s e r e l a t i o n s wi th 
Germany a s he was deposed in response to b i g powers ' 
r i v a l r y . The corona t ion of Mohammad Reza shah and t h e 
removal of Reza Shah took p l a c e a t the s t a n c e of the A l l i e d 
powers . Af t e r t h e a c c e s s i o n / ' ' throne,Mohammad Reza shah 
o 
planned and executed, h i s foreign po l icy e n t i r e l y inc l ined 
towards West, As the divis ion of power in the vorld had 
^j.Qated t\K) main blocks, the West led by U.S.A. and the 
East led by USSR, the countr ies mainly i n d u s t r i a l , t i l t 2 d 
towards Iran and t h i s region with the ob jec t ives of 
economic and s t r a t e g i c g a i n s . The main i n t e r e s t s were of 
economic gain and the el imination of R u s s i a influence in 
t h i s reg ion . Shah, hoping to s t e a l the r igh t opportuni ty 
s t re tched h i s hands towards west that could put Iran on 
the path of advancement. Shah's pol icy appeared to be well 
engines r ed . I rant within a short span of time, turned to be 
an economically s t ab le country and a t t a i ned strong s t r a t e g i c 
inpor tance . 
I t was the very c ruc ia l time a l l over the world when 
a f t e r the World War I I , reconstruct ion and rebui lding of 
sha t t e red and war h i t economies was ^t a rapid pace . 
I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was given p r i o r i t y for which the coxontries 
T^ere in the urgent need of o i l as a main source of energy 
for the movement of t h e i r wheels. On the o the r side, the 
smaller countr ies general ly , freed and unfreed colonies 
fVf . .c- were seeking help from t h e i r f r i end ly and 
pix)tecting na t i ons in order to develop t h e i r economies 
through i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . America and Br i ta in were much 
anxious due to the increasing Russian expansionism and 
inf luence . As a f t e r the world war I I , United S ta t e s of 
America and Russia emerged as super powers in the world, 
there was tug of war between them and a race to hold 
coxintries under t h e i r influence for which they adopted the 
pol icy of providing every sor t of help tha t t h e i r a l l i e s 
had to content with t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e . Iran was the s imi la r 
case tha t i t had to wholly r e ly on USA for the ass i s t ance 
p a r t i c u l a r l y technology and war equipment. The s i t ua t ion 
had conplete ly turned in favour of America tha t Iran 
remained c r ipp led without the American mi l i t a ry a id which 
included exper t i se , and spa.re p a r t s of war machinery e t c . 
On the o the r side of the coin, America did not leave even 
a s ingle stone unturned in holding her fee t in I r an . 
This was the r e s u l t of hard bargaining tha t America could 
be able to make Shah's foreign pol icy e n t i r e l y in her 
fgvour. In re turn , Iran got such a big help from America 
tha t shor t ly i t turned to be a strong power of the sub-
cont inen t . 
Shah's steep inc l ina t ion and warm welcome to America 
seemed to have been well conceived and well planned move. 
But Shah was unaware of the revolut ionary process cooking 
ins ide with slow pace, which smashed the e n t i r e bui ld ing 
of Shah's hopes which took about th ree decades to complete. 
The f ac to r s which did not impress the fana t ic 
r e l i g i o u s groups but annoyed them, were Shah's t i l t e d 
pol icy and h i s almost e n t i r e dependence on America, f as t 
modernization owing to the western impact and the p r e -
ference to the royal e l i t e s and n a t i o n a l i s t s . The 
r e l i g i o u s groups, who were /^  weaker .' could * 
no longer t o l e r a t e one man's super io r i ty and changing 
society and u l t imate ly came down to revo l t against Shah 
and monarchy. The year 1979 does not stand as a mile-
stone in the iJSriai h i s to ry but a turning point where Mohd 
Reza Shah had to content himself with ban; ishment due to 
coitplete f a i l u r e of h i s ovn p o l i c i e s . 
The present study i s a modest attempt to h ighl ight 
the main po in t s of Mohammad Reza Shah's foreign p o l i c i e s . 
As the t i t l e suggests, the study concentra tes on the Shah's 
t i l t which he showed through foreign pol icy and l i b e r a l 
ideas. 
The ent i re study has been xandertaken in seven 
chapters. As the f i r s t chapter throws light on geo-pol i -
cal factors influencing foreign policy and the significance 
of o i l in the economy. The second chapter undertakes a 
brief study of the change of powers and the system of 
government emerged after the 5^ohammad Reza Shah's accession. 
The thi rd chapter reveals the ideologies of outgoing and 
incoming monarchs and the i r royal e l i t e followed by an 
assessment of international situation which further mirrors 
the super powers' interest in Iran and the i r relat ions with 
i t separately, 
I ran ' s foreign policy and i t s supremacy in the 
region have been discussed in the f i f th chapter. 
The l a s t t\-jo chapters reflect the real picture of 
I ran ' s foreign - r- - policy and present some findings. 
(a) Geo-po l i t i ca l s igni f icance : 
Iran i s bounded on the north by the Caspian Sea, 
Transcaucasian and Turkish t e r r i t o r i e s of U.S.S.R. On the 
eas t by Afghanistan and Pakistan, on South by Persian Gulf 
and Gulf of Oman and on the west by I r aq and 1"urkey, 
I t i s s t r u c t u r a l l y complex a r ea . I t has p o l i t i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s coupled with the d i f f i c u l t na ture of the country 
i t s e l f . I t cons i s t s of an i n t e r i o r p la teau 1,000 m to 1500 m. 
above the sea l e v e l . I t i s r inged with mountain zones of 
varying height and ex t en t . The l a rges t mountain massif i s 
t ha t of Zaqros, which runs from the north-west of I ran, where 
the f r o n t i e r s of I ran, the Soviet Union, Turkey 
and Iraq meet, f i r s t south westwards to the eastern shores 
of the Persian Gulf and then eastwards, l i e s along the 
Arabian Sea, continuing into Baluchis tan, 
. Joining the Zaqros in the north-west , end running 
along the southern edge of the Caspian sea, i s the narrower 
but equal ly high Elburz range. Whilst along the eastern 
f ron t i e r of Iran are several sca t t e red mountain, claims l e s s 
continuous and imposing than e i t h e r the Zaqros or the 
Elburz, but su f f i c i en t ly high to act as b a r r i e r . 
Iran has a nuinber of mineral resources , some of 
•which are exploi ted on the commercial s c a l e . The recent ly 
discovered copper deposi t s a t Sarcheshmah could be taken 
as l a rges t among the count r ies of the v » r l d . I t has the 
second l a rges t gas depos i t s in the v o r l d . In 1977 an 
announcement was made regarding large sca le deposi ts of coal 
near Kerman, I ranians always had the super io r i ty in c ra f t -
man ship p a r t i c u l a r l y in metal wsrk and carpet making, A 
major i n d u s t r i a l complex based on s t e e l mi l l at Esfahan took 
shape. Oi l became the main source of revenue, 
I r a n ' s geopo l i t i c a l locat ion and i t s nearness to 
Soviet Union make her a s t a t e with a permanent secur i ty 
problem. Her hyperdependency on the balance of forces among 
the great powers and t h e i r norms of conduct, in i n t e rna t iona l 
context,^; by her emergence as a s t a t e with increased 
1, Middle East and North Africa 1988; (Europa, London, 
1987;, p . 380 
influence I.' some loca l j^is sues . Shah's 
dependence on cer ta in f r iendly s t a t e s l i ke U.S.A increased 
her g lobal importance. 
I t i s a s t a t e tha t may have important bearing on 
i n t e rna t i ona l p o l i t i c s which may have impl icat ions on her 
ovjn s e c u r i t y . I t ' s dependence can be looked within i n t e r -
na t iona l context by adopting accurate perception, speed 
and f l e x i b i l i t y . I t needs no doubt a spec ia l ized agency 
looking or appraising the fac tor of alignments with super-
powers looking t h e i r domestic needs and within i n t e rna t iona l 
norms. I t needs a sens i t ive hand of con t ro l s , and a very 
soft diplomacy. And if f a i l s in above for promotion of 
b e t t e r coordination i t w i l l become very cos t ly and d i f f i c u l t 
2 
to manage i t . The economic growth and the p o l i t i c a l devel-
opment are also a complex consideration, which sh i f t i t s 
a t t en t ion to domestic i s s u e s . The domestic economy has 
an important . bearing and influence on the foreign policy 
p r i o r i t i e s . The tendency of seeking r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n by 
2, 'Chubin Shar0m« 
" I r a n ' s Foreign Policy, 1960-76",sadeghi,Amir, 
Twen t i e t h Cen turY__Ir a} , (Lon don, He inemann, 19 7 7 ) , 
p p . 216-17, 
taking decision through specialized studies for day-to-day 
level existing problems i s an important issue e.g. United 
States domestic po l i t i cs , or pressures operating in in t ra-
Arab diplomacy can improve only^-caking rat ionale decisions, 
act as buffers insulating breakdovjns in one area from 
reacting on the t o t a l i t y of the relationship.The Iranian 
assurance to Pakistan's t e r r i t o r i a l integri ty , including 
naval plans of Iran, base at chah Bahar on the Makyan coast, 
disquieted, Nevj Delhi. Shah's approach in Indian subcontinent 
was based on i t s 'quiet diplomacy'. Therefore, he sought 
to improve relat ions V7ith each s ta te individually, encouraged 
consultations among them, gave a stake in a peaceful and 
stabil ized region. I t s policy with regard to India and 
Pakistan became more balanced and much be t te r with India 
between 1973 and 1976. I t gavel to India oJ- at concessional 
r a t e s . Shah declared his expl ic i t po l i t i ca l interest in 
regional s t ab i l i ty underlinked her petro-dollar diplomacy. 
I t included the poss ib i l i ty of a road and r a i l routes from 
Iran through Pakistan to India to f a c i l i t a t e t rans i t of 
goods. I t offered Turkey a huge amoxint of credit in part 
for road and r a i l improvement. Shah had throvn an idea of 
producing arms jo in t ly with Turkey Pakistan and India, 
I r a n ' s d ive r s i f i ca t i on of r e l a t i o n s , her increased 
regional contacts and i n i t i a t i v e s r e f l e c t an understanding 
t h a t was an a c t i v i s t diplomacy. I t was a best t a c t i c for 
a s t a t e exposed to i t s bordering s t a t e s , I r a n ' s a c t i v i s t 
diplomacy has thus been geared to using to a maximum the 
room for manoeuvre offered by the contemporary in t e rna t iona l 
system, and to seeking, to the degree poss ib le , to shape 
her own regional environment, 
(b) Determining Factors of Foreign Pol icy during 1941-79; 
After looking in to the g e o - p o l i t i c a l pos i t ion , i t 
aims to examine the f ac to r s and forces shaping the foreign 
pol icy of I r a n , 
( l ) Geographic Location; 
I t i s one of tfie most influencing fac tor of i t s 
foreign po l i cy . I t served as a bridge between the Middle 
East and Southern and Western Asia, between Russia and Persian 
Gulf, through the S t r a i t of Hormuz, between Russia and the 
Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea, The post 1941 period exh ib i t s 
c lash of great power and more recent ly super power i n t e r e s t s 
12 
in I r an , Great Br i ta in was replaced by United S t a t e s . The 
East-West conf l i c t has posed problems s imi la r to those 
r e su l t i ng from the Anglo-Russian r i v a l r y for the pol icy 
makers of I r a n , 
( i i ) Great Power Rivalry : 
The r i s e of a strong cen t ra l government under Reza 
Shah, the reluctance of the nevj regime in Russia to i n t e r -
vene in the a f f a i r s of Iran, and coi r d i a l B r i t i s h pol icy 
achieved an unprecedented degree of poli t ico-economic 
freedom from Great Br i ta in and Russia during the intervj^r 
per iod , I r a n ' s rapproachment with Germany, was f i r s t t o l e -
ra ted by both Great Br i ta in and Russia, But the invasion 
of Russia by Germany terminated t h i s t o l e r a n c e . Fa i lu re 
to copewith t h i s s i tua t ion r e a l i s t i c a l l y brought on the 
Al l ied invasion of Iran in 1941, But abdicat ion of throne 
by Reza Shah in favour of h i s son Mohammad Reza Shah was the 
great power i n t e r e s t in which Bri ta in ran away from the 
scenario and United S t a t e s took ac t ive i n t e r e s t and had 
influence during the whole period of Mohammad Reza Shah, 
( i i i ) Nat ional Disixnity : 
I4Dst of I r a n ' s fore ign-pol icy dec is ions were 
hampered by the lack of na t iona l u n i t y . Reza Shah's r e l a t i v e 
success vjas to a s ign i f i can t extent due to h i s a b i l i t y to 
impose an unprecedented degree of conformity. His abdication 
threw the p o l i t y back into anarchy, but the presence of 
foreign t roops helped check the t h r ea t of d i s i n t eg ra t i on 
of the p o l i t i c a l system, Insp i t e of t h i s , the t r a d i t i o n a l 
fact ional ism, t r iba l i sm, and localism were looked in p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s and a fragmented parliamentary body. During the 
reign of I'iohammad Reza Shah Society was s t i l l divided along 
e thnic , l i n g u i s t i c , p rovinc ia l , and socio-economic l i n e s . 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan posed ser ious chal lenges to I r a n ' s 
independent existence and foreign po l i cy . I r a n ' s pro-
western posture and a l l i ance probably changed i t s neu t ra l i sm. 
(iv) Oil : 
f " 
The discovery of o i l ) large quant i ty in Iran 
added i t s s t r a t e g i c s ignif icance in respect of great-power 
r i v a l r y . The revenues from o i l contr ibuted g rea t ly to the 
1-t 
count ry ' s f inanc ia l s t rength and ied to a g rea t e r degree of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n which vjould probably not have been possible 
without such revenues. 
I t became nore s ign i f i can t fac tor since 1941, The 
o i l c r i s i s of 1944 and the continuing d ispute with the 
Anglo-Iranian o i l company culminating in the na t iona l i za t ion 
of o i l industry in 1951 are too well known to r e i t e r a t e he re . 
The in t e rna t iona l consortium, the grant of new o i l concessions, 
and the discovery of fresh o i l resources on land and in the 
Persian Gulf cons t i t u t e a major l ink between Iran and the 
West, 
(v) Mon archy : 
-Between the f i r s t world war and the accession of 
Reza Shah to the throne of Iran some supporters of the 
cons t i t u t i ona l Koverasnt played a dominant ro le in the formu-
la t ion and execution of I r a n ' s foreign p o l i c y . Several 
s ign i f i can t foreign pol icy decis ions were made during t h e i r 
governments, including the signing of the 1921 t r e a t y with 
Russia and re jec t ion of the 1919 agreement with Great 
B r i t a i n , 
J 
1 J 
In the ea r ly postwar period and during the na t iona-
l i z a t i o n c r i s i s h i s ro l e was s i gn i f i c an t l y overshadowed by 
the Majlis and a few strong Prime Minis ters , but t h i s proved 
to be an aberra t ion , as was the case in the ear ly 1920 's . 
Since 1954 I r a n ' s foreign pol icy has for a l l p r a c t i c a l 
purposes been the Shah's foreign po l icy , 
(vi) Shei ' ism : 
The S h i ' i ideology i s perhaps more than any o the r 
s ingle fac tor , tha t a s s i s t e d the r i s e of modem Iran • 
;,,^,_ , S h i ' i influence on the foreign pol icy of Iran frpm 
1925 to 1941 was about n i l . But during the na t iona l i za t i on 
c r i s i s when Mullah Kashani and National Front Cooperated 
looked much i n f l u e n t i a l . The influence of the clergy on the 
na t i ona l i s a t i on policy was by no means i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Nor 
was the implementation of tha t pol icy immune from out-
b u r s t s of S h i ' i fanat ic ism, 
(v i i ) Nationalism : 
I t was a very influencing factor during 1905-1941, 
The cons t i t u t i ona l Movement was b a s i c a l l y a n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement. I t aimed s ign i f i can t ly at the elimination of 
Anglo-Russian control in favour of na t i ona l i n t e r e s t s "^^ 
foreign po l i cy , s ince 1941, the problem was not tha t 
nat ional ism played a dominant ro le , but vias whose nat ional ism, 
Some bel ieved tha t Shah was not a t rue n a t i o n a l i s t because 
t h e i r concept of I r a n ' s na t iona l i n t e r e s t d i f fered from h i s 
own i n t e r e s t . However in h i s l a s t days of reign. Shah's 
pos i t ive nat ional ism dominated I r a n ' s foreign p o l i c y . 
The t h i r d jxDwer and equil ibrium was also an 
important f a c t o r , Reza Shah's abdication marked the 
beginning of I r a n ' s revived i n t e r e s t in the United S t a t e s 
as the t h i r d power in the per iod of the second world war, 
but as the cold war developed and .the two poles became 
increasingly v i s i b l e , t h i r d power diplomacy fovind l i t t l e 
app l i ca t ion . The foreign pol icy of Iran was affected by the 
East-West cold war as i t happened in the n ine teenth-century 
Anglo-Russian r i v a l r y , Iran continued to u t i l i z e the 
techniques of m u l t i l a t e r a l diplomacy and regionalism in i t s 
3 
r e l a t i o n s with other s t a t e s . 
3 , Ramazani, R,K,, 
'^]i?_J!2££^S}-5*^li£y of I r an , A developing Nation in 
World Affairs"~^l500-194lT7 (University Press of Virginia , 1966), p . 312. 
^^^ Oil ,^}d the Economy of Iran : 
I r a n ' s o i l production in 1976 was about 6,5 mil l ion 
b a r r e l s of o i l per day. People in general think tha t Iran 
i s pr imar i ly an o i l producing country. But i t i s not t r u e . 
For cen tur ies Iran has been pr imar i ly an a g r i c u l t u r a l 
coxxntry. In present s i tua t ion also a g r i c u l t u r e occupies 
an important place in the economy. 
During 1940s, 1950s o i l over-shadowed a g r i c u l t u r e . 
I t i s a fact t ha t o i l i s the backbone of the Iranian 
economy. During world war second Iran received guarantee 
of £ 4 mil l ion re turn at the o i l - f i e l d s expenses of Iran by 
All ied Powers. Al l ied Forces occupied Iran on 23 August/1941,' 
in order to safeguard the o i l f i e l d s and Eastern supply 
r o u t e s . By 1950# production became 31 mil l ion tons per 
annum and d i r e c t revenues a t £ 16 mil l ion quadrupled the 
amount of ten years back. 
The decision to n a t i o n a l i s e AIOC's operat ions in 
May 1951 by the Prime jyiinister Mohammad Mossadegh was made 
due to i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l reasons to a t t ack Pahlavi dynasty. 
An o i l company executive in Iran l a t e r observed about 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of o i l . 
"When the Majlis passed the b i l l n a t i ona l i s i ng o i l , 
they simply thont channelling p r o f i t s , which they 
exaggerated in to the na t iona l co f fe r s . No one had any r ea l 
idea what na t i ona l i s a t i on meant or en ta i led" , 
I t ineans in economic terms i t r e su l t ed in to economic 
l o s s e s . From 1951 u n t i l l 1954 the Iranian o i l indust ry 
v i r t u a l l y closed dovn. Iran fo r f e i t ed i t s posi t ion as the 
leading producer of o i l in the Middle Eas t , I r a n ' s f i r s t 
attempt of planned economic development was completely under-
mined. On account of the lack of su f f i c i en t f i nanc i a l 
resources the f i r s t plan could not be implemented. In the 
Second Plan (1955-62), one fourth of the funds was a l loca ted 
towards completing p ro jec t s unfinished o r not i n i t i a t e d in 
the F i r s t Plan (1948-54), The o i l indus t ry of Iran was 
na t iona l i s ed in May 1951 by Mossadegh, Shah was aware of i t s 
consequences. He had the idea tha t Iranians were unable to 
handle the o i l industry in the country as from a long per iod 
t h i s industry was handled by the fo r e igne r s . Shah and h i s 
close supporters , at no stage opposed a renegot ia t ion of the 
1933 o i l agreement between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian o i l 
4 
company (AIOC) . In 1954, Shah signed on an agreement 
with United S ta t e s and created new company known as consor-
tium and he declared, " i t s most important r e s u l t was the 
terminat ion, once and for a l l , of the B r i t i s h monopolistic 
hold over I r a n ' s indus t ry" , Br i t i sh share in t h i s regard 
was reduced and 40 per cent of the t o t a l share was given to 
the five U.S. companies. The U.S. o i l i n t e r e s t f i n a l l y got 
a fooihold in the Iranian o i l f i e l d , helped the resumption 
and continuation of the flow of 'embargo p r o o f Iranian o i l 
suppl ies to the markets of i t s West European a l l i e s and 
f r iends , and to i t s own market as we l l . Such/ - of 
Iranian o i l was considered benef ic ia l in i n d u s t r i a l , econo-
mic p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c terms. The increase in o i l 
sa le led to an increase in o i l revenues. The modernisation 
of economy and mi l i t a ry was ca r r i ed o u t . Shah bel ieved 
tha t new o i l agreement helped h i s regime in three wavs i t 
4 , Saikal , Amin. The Rise and F a l l of the Shah, 
(Princeton Univers i ty Press , 1980)7 P . 97~ 
earned increased revenues, involved the U.S. i n t e r e s t s in 
Iranian o i l , simultaneously terminated the many years of 
B r i t i s h monopoly of I ranian o i l i ndus t ry . 
Shah f e l t tha t Iran could as se r t i t s independence 
and maximise i t s p o t e n t i a l o i l resources to form a na t iona l 
o i l company. Through the National Iranian o i l company (NIOC) 
and smaller and independent i n t e rna t iona l o i l companies he 
could carry-out j o i n t explorat ion and production "-
In 1957 Enrico Matter, the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c head of I t a l y ' s 
S ta te o i l concern EN I, concluded an agreement whereby NIDC 
vas to get 75 per cent of the proceeds on discovery of o i l . 
So Iran could obtain such terms through negot ia t ion and v^ith 
foreign p a r t n e r s . But such agreements f a i l ed to s t r i k e o i l 
on the scale of consortium a rea . 
Mili tancy within OPEC increased, and I r a n ' s bargaining 
posi t ion improved in r e l a t i on to the con sor t iu|n. In 1970 
world crude o i l demand was the beginning to place the o i l 
producers in s e l l e r ' s market, Tht changed circumstances 
were symbolised in Teheran Agreements on 14 February 1971 
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between the rep resen ta t ives of the Gulf producers and the 
i n t e rna t i ona l o i l companies. In money terms i t increased 
30 cents per b a r r e l over a f ive year per iod to 50 c e n t s . 
Between 1970 and 1972 production increased from an average 
of 3.82 mil l ion b a r r e l s a day to 5,02 mil l ion b a r r e l s a 
day and revenues from $ 1.12 b i l l i o n t o $ 2,39 b i l l i o n . 
On 20 March 1973, an agreement v i t h consortium 
•was signed ." , consortium handed over a l l remaining 
operat ions and ownership to NIOC, The consortium agreed 
to form a specia l contract ing company^ Oil service company 
of Iran (OSCO)/ to provide the much needed exper t i se t o ' 
run and a s s i s t in the development of the Khuzestan F ie lds -
an area s l i g h t l y smaller than, the o r i g i n a l consortium 
acreage. In p r a c t i c e NIOC marketed much more crude than 
l a i d down in the agreement, i t was over 45 per cent above 
quota in 1976 and 30,per cent in l977o The consortium 
for i t s par t l i f t e d l e s s crude than an t ic ipa ted , and according 
to NIOC, l e s s than cont rac ted . The Plans of Iran were much 
dependent on o i l revenues e . g . 62/4 in Third Plan (1962-7), 
63 per cent in. Fourth Plan (1968-72), 80 per cent in f i f t h 
Plan (1973-78) due to o i l p r ice r i s e s in 1973. 
5 , GrahaiTv Robert. 
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Today I r a n ' s r u r a l economy i s l i t t l e w e a l t h i e r 
than Egypt , A g r i c u l t u r e i s a means by which m a j o r i t y of 
I r a n i a n s d r i v e l i v e l i h o o d . But t h e handicap has been t h e 
l ack of w a t e r . I n s u f f i c i e n t water s u p p l i e s r e s u l t e d i n t o 
b r i n g i n g l e s s a rea of l and xinder c u l t i v a t i o n , A l a r g e 
p o r t i o n of l and i s d e s e r t i nc lud ing Dash t e Kavir and 
Dash, te l u t . About 25 per cen t c o n s i s t s of town, v i l l a g e s , 
roads and su r face water , 13 pe r cen t p o t e n t i a l l y c u l t i -
vab l e and p r o d u c t i v e l and and 12 p e r cen t f o r e s t s . Thus 
only 22 m i l l i o n h e c t a r e s of t h e t o t a l l and a r ea i s capab le 
of e x p l o i t a t i o n for a g r i c u l t u r a l purposes , and of t h i s 
only 8 m i l l i o n h e c t a r e s i s be ing c u l t i v a t e d . 
The i r r i g a t i o n r e l i e d upon undergrovmd water 
channe l s c a l l e d qana t sys tem. Roughly one t h i r d of a l l 
i r r i g a t i o n a s l a t e a s t h e e a r l y 1970s r e l i e d upon qanat sys-
tem. The advent of modem aam-bui ldinq in I ran ( the f i r s t 
was completed in 1957),A' - • ^ , ' ; 
. • • ' ^ ' • - •; •• • ^^ p r e s e n t 
roughly 4 ,5 m i l l i o n h e c t a r e s of l and i s capable of be ing 
i r r i g a t e d but on ly 70 pe r cen t has n e c e s s a r y i n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
and l e s s than 30 p e r cen t i s be ing p r o p e r l y w a t e r e d . In 
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1920S when..vigorous na t iona l and i n t e rna t i ona l measures were 
taken to curb opium production in Iran, Iranian farmers 
were producing 30 per cent of the wor ld ' s production. The 
crop provided 15 per cent of export earnings/accounted 
10 per cent of tax revenues. But /^s now under s t r i c t control 
for domestic medical needs . 
Iran was la rge ly s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t in foodstuffs upto 
the ea r ly 1960s and balanced i t s d e f i c i t by exports of cotton, 
f r u i t s and n u t s . However, d i e t contained low-calory and 
l i t t l e meat. After the 1973 o i l p r i ce r i s e , food consumption 
shot up, crea t ing a subs t an t i a l dependence upon imports.* 
VJhen land reforms were made by Shah l i t t l e thought was given 
to matter- of improved performance from a g r i c u l t u r a l s ec to r . 
I t was a p o l i t i c a l l y motivateci/by Shah to win over the r u r a l 
masses and c u r t a i l the power of the b ig land o \ ^ e r s . Insp i te 
of the p o l i t i c a l motivation for land reform^ the f i r s t stage 
had a s ign i f i can t impact in the count rys ide . For the f i r s t 
time many farmers had the chance of enter ing the modem 
economy, although the measures were not comprehensive. They 
ignored the problems of the poorest members of the r u r a l 
commonity,the landless labourers who comprised as much as 
25 per cent of the work-force. So in many cases the 
divis ion between those v i t h land and those without land was 
made no re s t r a t i f i e d and pronounced. 
Infact the introduction of land reform coincided 
with the beginning of a sharp decl ine in a g r i c u l t u r e ' s 
ove ra l l importance in the economy, I t i* tha t Shah 
de l i be r a t e ly sac r i f i ced ag r i cu l tu re in order to concentrate 
on bui lding up an i n d u s t r i a l base . In the period 1959 to 
l972 ag r i cu l tu re received a mere 8 per cent of investment 
against 22 per cent for indus t ry . Government's energy was 
devoted to i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , i t lacked the wi l l to follow 
through a t a g r a s s - roo t s l e v e l . But in purely] • . , terms 
ag r i cu l tu re s t i l l received a s izeable stun. 
The growth of I ranian economy has been appreciably 
rap id . Since mid 1950s, industry in p a r t i c u l a r expanded 
f a s t . The millenium had not come and the world had survived 
without Iranian o i l . He had threatened the United 
S ta tes with a communist Iran unless her p o l i c i e s 
received wholehearted support and subs t an t i a l 
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f inanc ia l backing. But Eisenhower's cold response 
sha t te red tha t idea . 
After the L... _. _ of the B r i t i s h forces from 
Persian Gulf, Iran became a close a l l y of the United S ta tes , 
Under Nixon's tiine. United S ta tes not only avoided the 
commitment of U.S. t roops in the region, but supplied much 
arms to Iran .Iran became vjorld* s s ing le l a r g e s t customer for 
U.S. arms and mi l i t a ry t r a i n i n g . In addit ion to s t r a t e g i c 
i n t e r e s t s , U,S,A, used Iranian t e r r i t o r y to monitor Soviet 
compliance v i t h the terms of the S t r a t e g i c arms l imi ta t ion 
t r e a t y . In t h i s respect the advantages to the U,s.A, vas t ly 
exceeded both i t s ovn need for Middle East o i l , and the 
need to p ro tec t western access to the un in te r rupted flow 
of Persian Gulf o i l s u p p l i e s . Iran helped to maintain the 
global s t r a t e g i c balance between the United S t a t e s and the 
Soviet Union., President Eisenhower of U.S.A. quoted af te r 
the overthrow of Musadiq's government tha t Shah recognized 
h i s debt to uSo He hoped tha t he should have a r e a l i s t i c 
understanding and importance of I r an , Further he s a i d , 
tha t Shah was fu l ly aware of the importance of the array for 
the secur i ty of h i s coiontry and convinced i t could become 
a s ign i f i can t l ink ixi the free vjorld's defence -with a 
proper h e l p . 
On October 8, 1953, pres ident quoted tha t if the 
Shah and h i s new premier be a l i t t l e b i t f l ex ib l e United 
S ta t e s would stand by to help both f i nanc i a l l y and with 
wise counsel, and would give ser ious defeat to Russians 
in tent ion in tha t a rea . 
The Shah and the pres ident were both animated by 
vigorous opposition to Soviet ambitions in Iran and the 
Middle Eas t , The s ignif icance of o i l d i sputes set t lement 
transcended both and confined o i l revenues and i n t e r e s t s 
of the in t e rna t iona l o i l indus t ry . For broader s t r a t e g i c 
and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s Iran and United S t a t e s did not want 
to see the d e t a i l s of agreement to assemble a passenger car, 
the F ia t 1100 was signed in i960. The f i r s t comprehensive 
attempt to survey I r a n ' s mineral resources was i n i t i a t e d in 
1962 with the foimdation of the Geological I n s t i t u t e . In 
196 2 I r a n ' s f i r s t f e r t i l i s e r plant a t Shiraz began to 
opera te . The f i r s t Iranian assembled t r a c t o r l e f t i t s 
Romanian b u i l t factory in Tabriz in 1968, In 1972 the f i r s t 
key engineering u n i t s , machine too l p l an t s a t Tabriz and 
i/ 
Arak became o p e r a t i o n a l . The Esfahan S tee l mi l l , the 
Aryamehr complex, began operation in 1973. 
But ear ly e f f o r t s to re ly more extensively upon o i l 
revenues were badly upset by Mossadegh's o i l n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . 
Iran was f rus t r a t ed in maximising o i l revenue by the nature 
of the i n t e rna t i ona l market and h i s t o r i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s with 
the o i l companies. As l a t e as 1971 Iran was forced to re ly 
upon advances by the consortium agains t r o y a l t i e s as means of 
addi t iona l f inance. A modem sector grew upside by side with 
the t r a d i t i o n a l ru ra l economy. Like many r u l e r s of developing 
count r ies , Mohammed Reza Shah mixed p o l i t i c s and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
development so tha t the two considera t ions were completely 
interwined. Agr icul tura l development came to be t r e a t e d 
as an issue of land ownership and the a l leg iance of the 
ru ra l masses ra ther than economic product ion. Thus when the 
consumer demand began to increase and l iv ing standards rose, 
e spec ia l ly from the l a t e 1960s onwards, Iran suddenly had 
to face a s i tua t ion of foodstuffs d e f i c i t . 
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CHAPTER - I I 
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN IRAN AND EMERGENCE 
OF MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH 
Reza Khan, t h e f a t h e r of Mohammad Reza s h a h j o i n e d 
t h e Russ ian-commanded P e r s i a n c o s s a c k B r i g a d e i n 1 8 9 3 . He 
was an i m p o s i n g f i g u r e who d i s t i n g u i s h e d h i m s e l f among h i s 
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c o l l e a g u e s . He was h a v i n g a b u r n i n g s e n s e of p a t r i o t i s m , 
I r a n i a n s t o o k Reza Shah a b u i l d e r l i k e A t a t u r k , t h e 
T u r k i s h s t r o n g m a n . In f a c t he u n d e r t o o k a l o t of programmes 
f o r t h e deve lopmen t of t h e c o u n t r y . H i s major programmes 
i n c l u d e c o n s t r u c t i o n of r o a d s t o ' b i n d t h e c o u n t r y and make 
t h e l i f e of t h e p e o p l e s e c u r e and s a f e . The a p p r e c i a b l e 
a s p e c t of t h e whole programme was t h a t t h e s e r o a d s were 
c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h t h e i n d i g e n o u s r e s o u r c e s and money r a i s e d 
t h r o u g h t a x e s on v a r i o u s c o n s u m p t i o n g o o d s . He o p e n e d 
r e s o r t a r e a s a l o n g t h e c a s p i a n - R a m s c a r , Chajja-s and B a b o l s a r . 
He u n d e r t o o k a programme of c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e t r a n s -
I r a n i a n r a i l r o a d . In t r a d e and d o m e s t i c c o n c e r n , he was 
1 . Graham, R o b e r t , I r a n , The I l l u s i o n of Power, 
(London, Croom Helm, 1978 ) , p . 5 4 . 
a d i s t r u s t f u l of foreign powers. Hence he t r i e d to 
accomplish as much as he could without foreign a s s i s t a n c e . 
He abolished the concessionary t a r i f f system designed for 
the benef i t of English and Russians and ins tead of t h i s he 
introduced a system of p ro tec t ive t a r i f f s . He imposed 
government monopolies over the important i tems, such as 
sugar, tea , grain and tobacco. He sought to impose a 
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uniform tax system. He gave importance to the process of 
nodernisation of Iran, sent s tudents abroad, l a id foundation 
of Teheran Universi ty for higher s tud ies , abolished the f u l l 
v e i l for wDmen, He gave importance to na t iona l d igni ty , 
e s t ab l i sh ing c i v i l service and proper army. He did n o t ' 
secular ise Iran, perhaps because he wanted to r e t a in the 
importance of the S h i ' i a Moslem b e l i e f s which i s the special 
Islamic character of I r a n , He turned in to a d i c t a t o r using 
the th rea t of Soviet Subversion and he surrounded himself 
with undist inguished subservient men and a c i r c l e of 
3 
adv i s e r s . 
2, Inlow, E, Burke. Shah an shah, (Delhi, 1979), p . 201. 
3 . Op. c i t , , I r a n . The I l lus ion of Power, pp. 55-6 . 
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There were two important j u s t i f i c a t i o n s regarding 
h i s option for a monarchy. He j u s t i f i e d the nonarchy 
creat ing fear of Russia and concern over the e f f ec t s of 
Bolshevik revolut ion of 1917. Second reason was tha t the 
clergy would have been very suspicious of the idea of a 
r e p u b l i c . The crea t ion of republ ic might have a ground for 
4 fur ther s t r i f e and d i s u n i t y . 
He wanted to emancipate Iran from foreign inf luence . 
However, he adopted Western reforms and technology to 
modernize the country. For t h i s purpose he t r i e d to s t ren-
gthen h i s own posi t ion through the strong and powerful 
c e n t r a l government. The f i r s t thing tha t he made c lea r was 
the fac t tha t a well-organized, wel l -paid and d i sc ip l ined 
mi l i t a ry force could ensure the s t a b i l i t y of the country 
and through which peace and the law and order in the country 
could be obtained and maintained. For i n t e r n a l progress 
he inv i t ed American expert . Dr. Arthur Chester Millspaugh, 
4 . I b id . , p.54 
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to reorganize I r a n ' s public f inances . Shah vianted to improve 
the n a t i o n ' s communication system. He said t h i s -would provide 
a good government cont ro l of outlying regions and the eco-
5 
nomic prosper i ty w i l l be ensured. 
There were two main p o l i t i c a l groups the moderats 
and derrocrates. The supporters of the government in power 
were named as moderates. The opposit ion which was in 
minority named as democrats. But in 19 28 there were no such 
groups ex i s t i ng , the p a r t i e s were prohib i ted by Reza shah. 
During world war second, in 1941 Al l ied powers forced 
Reza Shah to leave the country Reza Shah abdicated the 
throne in favour of h i s son Mohammad Reza shah. He was 
declared the r u l e r of I r a n . He took h i s t o r i c s teps in regards 
to govesmment and ind iv idua l s . He r ees t ab l i shed those 
p rac t i ces which ex-Shah t r i e d to s top . He permitted the use 
of v e i l by women and r e c i t a t i o n of holy Quran on r a d i o . The 
r e l i g i o u s education was made compulsory a t school l eve l and 
5 . Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in Vtorld . -^fairs , 
(Cornell Univers i ty Pres's, 1952), pp . l7l-7 '2. 
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thousands of people were allowed for pilgrimage to Kiecca. 
He un i ted the country with the help of foreign t roops 
s ta t ioned in Iran during war. His stand about Azerbaijan 
republican raoveirent v i s - a - v i s Soviet Union made him popular . 
Oto implement the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision for organizing 
Senate, he was authorised to appoint t h i r t y Senators . Most 
of the appointees were old army o f f i c e r s , t h i s caused some 
influence over the a f f a i r s of the country . 
On October 4, 1941 he contacted with United S t a t e s 
minister in Teheran and said, "he would govern cons t i t u t i ona l ly 
* 
and look af te r the welfare of h i s people", the point he 
intended was tha t he "would be very happy to be an a l l y of 
America", He wanted to strengthen the Iranian forces , so 
government h i red a United S ta t e s mission, for reorganizat ion 
of the Shah's Imperial Gendarmerie, Therefore, he became 
able to check the p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s of the Muslim funda-
menta l i s t , the n a t i o n a l i s t and the comrrunist forces of the 
oppos i t ion , 
6 , Armjeni, Yahya. Middle East Past and. Present , 
-Prentice Hall, EngTS'i^crff CTTfTS N"77, 19-7t3, 
pp. 19-28-29. 
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19 41 to 1963 was a d i f f i c u l t era t e s t i n g and 
occass iona l ly eirbarrassing, I t may be conveniently divided 
in to three pe r iods . The period 1941-51 i s the period in 
vjhich he t r i e d to break the r e l a t i o n s -with Great Pov^rs. 
He re s to red na t iona l confidence af te r Al l ied occupation of 
I r an . Second period i s 1951-53 in which the t r i a l of h i s 
s t rength with Mossadegh at o i l na t i ona l i za t i on i s sue , forced 
him to leave the country res to red with American help. 1954-63, 
the gradual strengthening of royal au thor i ty and e s t a b l i s h -
ment of i n t e r n a l secur i ty through el iminat ion of P a r l i a -
. . 7 
mentary oppos i t ion . 
In 1960s the Shah's exclusive a l l i ance with the 
West and firm opposit ion to communism caused much harm '. 
than good to h i s regime. I t caused displeasure to the 
• Soviets and r a d i c a l Arabs including Afghanistanis and Indians 
looked suspicious towards h i s regime, jo in ing CENOXD, he 
began to s t r e s s tha t i t s membership i s not only helpful in 
mi l i t a ry f i e l d but could fos te r cooperation and understanding 
in non-mil i tary f i e l d s t o o . 
'7 • Op. ,„ci t . , I ran, The I l lus ion of Power, pp. 61 -2 . 
Highlighting h i s foreign pol icy goal , he declared, 
"Our pol icy i s based on maintenance 
and preservat ion of peace. We in Iran 
have adopted a pol icy which we c a l l a 
pol icy of independent na t iona l i sm. I t s 
e s s e n t i a l p r i nc ip l e s are non- in te r fe -
rence in the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of 
other count r ies and peaceful co-ex is -
t ence , VJe must go beyond t h i s stage 
and convert peaceful co-existence into 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation and under-
standing espec ia l ly to coun t r i es with 
d i f fe ren t p o l i t i c a l and soc ia l systems 
from ours , for without them the bas ic 
d i f f i c u l t i e s facing the world today, 
such as i l l i t e r a c y , sickness and hunger 
can not be solved. We bel ieve tha t the 
way to safeguard the r e a l i n t e r e s t s of 
our country i s by co-exis tence and 
sincere cooperation with a l l coun t r i e s . 
On the b a s i s of mutual respect for 
na t iona l Sovereignty. At t^e 
3o 
same time the establishment of , , , 
understanding and peace can not 
be achieved without s incere 
respect for the p r inc ip l e of 
co-existence between d i f fe ren t 
ideologies and systems of govern-
ment, or without respect for the 
p r inc ip le of non- in ter ference 
of the countr ies in the i n t e rna l 
g 
affairs of others". 
After consulting survivors of constitutional era. 
Shah determined to call elections for constituent 
Assembly for the purpose of amending the constitution. 
The objective was to take more power. This Assembly made 
provision of a Senale, assigned power to Shah of 
9 
dissolution of parliament. 
8 . S a i k a l , Amin. The Rise and F a n of Shah. 
(Pr ince ton U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 198oT# PP. 92-93 
•Greaves/ Rose' "^The Reign of Mohammad Reza shah" 
(19 42-19 76 ) , s a d e g h i . Amir. Twen t_ieth_cen tury_^ran 
(London, Heinemann 1977),p."70. 
Shah a l loca ted a s izeable port ion of the budget for 
mi l i t a ry purpose. From 1965 to 1974 Iran purchased with 
United S t a t e s alone about $ 7^300 mil l ion worth of defence 
equipment and se rv i ces . He t r i e d to organise h i s loyal 
p a r t i e s , but could not get success . In the l a s t days, 
of h i s reign. Resurgence (Raslakhiz) pa r ty f a i l e d . He 
l a t e r abolished i t . He formed o ther p a r t i e s which were 
led by government o f f i c i a l s , were more o r l e s s an arm of 
bureaucracy. But such were not supported by mass of the 
people . The persons who supported these p a r t i e s e i t h e r 
were the supporters of white revolut ion or they wanted t h e i r 
job secure . The r i s e in o i l income in 1973 made poss ib le 
for Shah to acce le ra te a l l services both quan t i t a t i ve ly 
and q u a l i t i v e l y . Therefore the creat ion of a modern, 
balanced defence force, taking the b e n e f i t s of new 
technology re f l ec ted a long-standing de s i r e by the Shah 
to save h i s own secu r i ty . Along with t h i s a decision 
to expand the navy five times to obtain a maritime capabi-
l i t y of an independent self-support ing type to conduct 
long-range naval ope ra t ions . Shah had a number of 
10, i b i d . , p , 202. 
•J 
organisations to supervise, control and if needed repress 
the potential opposition. The increasing oil revenues were 
used for enhancing the internal and external security. He 
created intelligence organisation SAVAK for which he tried 
to exceed over the CIA of America in regards to time, 
functions methods and techniques. For external matter he 
made agreement for defence with U.S.A. Moreover, the 
discipline power and mobility of the armed forces and 
national police had been increased. Control over mass media 
had been tightened. Due to this least freedom of expression 
was allowed. The regime successfully demoralized many of 
opposite groups by broadening its support among foreign 
11 
nations. 
Jus t as Mossadegh eroded the Shah's power in 1951, 
Shah too s t a r t ed to consol idate h i s own posi t ion at the 
expense of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and Parl iament . The p a r t i e s 
were banned and replaced through two puppet p a r t i e s , the 
Melliyun: (Nat ional is t ) end the Mardom (People 's) p a r t i e s , 
headed by h i s loyal l i eu t enan t s . He t ightened the censorship 
11. Zonis, Marvin« Tj}g„Poj-itical_Elite _of Iran, 
(Princeton Univer"siity Press , I97 l ) , pp"I 39-40. 
in the country. Opposition p a r t i e s l ike National Front 
12 Party of Mossadegh or Tudeh Party were suppressed r u t h l e s s l y . 
In the Shah's twenty-five years period ru le of 
supremacy (since the f a l l of Premier Mossadegh in 1953) 
opposi t ion could not be el iminated completely. The three 
main components, r e l i g i o u s leaders , National Front and 
communist var ied in s t rength but t h e i r u l t imate goal -was to 
change the government. The S h e i ' i leaders through regular 
contact with praying mult i tudes in the mosques had the 
highest mobilizing capac i ty . The communist had t h e i r own 
experienced sk i l fu l ope ra t ions . The National Front off'ered 
the best a r t i c u l a t i o n of demands for democratic freedoms 
and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . In about two and half decades of 
the Shah's ru le a f te r Mossadegh, Iran became a vast building 
s i t e producing a lo t of elements of modernization. Univer-
s i t i e s , Schools and profess ional i n s t i t u t i o n s , h o s p i t a l s 
roads, rai lways, dams, power s t a t i o n s , gas -p ipe l ines , factories, 
i n d u s t r i a l , c u l t u r a l and spor ts complexes, cooperat ives, new 
towns e t c . 
^2- _2P_s_£ii«' ^^^" - The I l l u s ion of Power, p . 68 
The year 1979 proves to be a turning point for 
Iranian Sh i ' i sm. A r e a l s p i r i t of she i ' i sm may be looked. 
Over l a s t few decades Shi ' ism has been craf ted for a 
rroral platform to c r i t i c i s e the defects of Pahlavi regime 
l ike the in t imidat ion by secret po l ice , the massive 
corruption in Society, the des t ruct ion of ag r i cu l tu re , the 
pr imi t ive pr ice regula t ion compaigns aga ins t the bazaar, 
the misuses of t a l e n t s of the middle c l a s s , subordination 
to I ran ians under imper i a l i s t i n t e r e s t s , and separation of 
monarchy from accountabi l i ty and responsiveness to i t s ovm 
people. But now the S h i ' i t e leaders have the opportuni ty to 
t r a n s l a t e t h e i r moral opposit ion and soc ia l c r i t i c i s m into 
a framework for modern p o l i t i c s . Issues l ike nature of 
p o l i t i c s and economics, the posi t ion of women and r i g h t s of 
r e l i g i o u s , l i n g u i s t i c and c u l t u r a l minor i t i e s take a new 
relevance . 
13 . Fisher . Iran (From Religious Dispute to Revolution) 
Harvard Universi ty Press , USA, 1980, p . 2 3 l . ~ " 
CHAPTER - I I I 
' Li 
CHAPTER - I I I 
IDEOLOGY OF RULIT^ G MONARCH AND ROYAL ELITES 
The h i s t o r y of I ran i s f u l l of d y n a s t i c r u l e s . In 
t h e middle of t h e e i g h t e e n t h cen tu ry Nad i r Shah r e s t o r e d an 
I r a n i a n empire even g r e a t e r than t h e Sa fav id s , b u t 
remained fo r fe-w y e a r s . I t -was follovjed by t h e r u l e of 
Karim Khan Zand in S h i r a j and thofi by t h e Turk ish Qaj a r 
dynas ty of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . The Qajars were n o t 
we l l p r e p a r e d fo r t h e impact of Russ ia and t h e West. There-
fo re t h e p r e s t i g e of I ran and i t s p l a c e in t h e world sank 
u n t i l l 1920s, Resa Shah r eve r sed a t r e n d towards s t a g n a t i o n 
and s e t t h e n a t i o n on t h e road t o form t h e m a t e r i a l p r o g r e s s , 
^iohammad Reza S h a h ' s l a s t ten y e a r s reforms of h i s r e ign 
c a l l e d the White Revolu t ion , have produced a r a p i d econo-
mic development and p r o s p e r i t y . 
But t h e P a h l a v i dynasty was d i f f e r e n t from e a r l i e r 
d y n a s t i e s , a s Reza Shah i n i t i a t e d t h e f i r s t of a long 
s e r i e s of a c t i o n s des igned t o promote n a t i o n a l u n i t y . 
A c t u a l l y , they e s t a b l i s h e d conformity r a t h e r than u n i t y . 
In May 1925 he e l i m i n a t e d m i l i t a r y t i t l e s and l a i d t h e 
u 
foiandation of pahlavi dynasty. In the same year a spec ia l 
cons t i tuen t Assembly chose Reza Shah Pahlavi as the f i r s t 
r u l e r of the nevg dynasty. He f e l t more Keenly than 
any of h i s compatriots of I r a n ' s g lor ious past to resolve 
the country from her le thargy and to fos t e r na t iona l un i ty 
and p r i d e . 
Monarchy in r ea l sense i s more than executive of 
other c o u n t r i e s . The I r a n ' s greatness coincided with the 
able monarchs. The main c r ed i t of such monarchs vas t ha t 
they rose from amongst the people and they were a c t i v i s t s 
f u l f i l l i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l ro le of the monarch as 
Farmandeh' Commander of the people . Such monarchs enjoyed 
the mass support of the c i t i z e n s , to whom they were 
d i r e c t l y concerned. The Shah and the people, according to 
the 'phi losophy of I r a n ' s Revolution'/ cons t i t u t e only two 
superforces and no intermediary i s allowed in between 
d i r e c t r e l a t i onsh ip of the tv;o. They ensured the survival 
of the Iranian na t i on , Shahanshah stands above c l a s s or 
i n t e r e s t s of a p a r t i c u l a r group, being King of people 
having father-son r e l a t i on with nat ion, preservat ion of 
na t iona l uni ty and i n t e g r i t y . He was ca l l ed not only the 
1 p o l i t i c a l leader but s p i r i t u a l leader t o o . 
1, Graham, Robert, I r an . The I l l u s ion of Power, 
(London, Groom Helm 19 78), p ,59 . 
4-* 
A king before h i s coronation"^ was expected to take 
the follovjing oath, before the National Consul ta t ive 
Assenibly and in presence of the merribers of the Asserribly 
the senate and the cabinet such oath, 
" I c a l l upon God Almighty as witness , and I swear 
upon Glorious word of God (The Quran) and upon a l l t h a t i s 
respected by God to exert a l l rny e f fo r t s to preserve the 
independence of Iran, to p ro tec t the f r o n t i e r s of the 
country and r i g h t s of the nat ion, to be guardian of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law of Iran and to reign accordingly and 
* 
in conformity with es tab l i shed laws, and to endeavour to 
promote J a ' f a r i doctr ine of the sect of Twelve Imams, and 
in a l l my deeds and ac t ions I sha l l remember God, most 
Glorious, as being present and watchful, and sha l l have 
no aim but the happiness and greatness of the Sta te and the 
nat ion of I r a n . And I seek the aid of God, whose help i s 
begged by a l l to serve the progress of Iran with success, 
and I seek the help of the Holy s p i r i t s of the Great 
2 
Sani ts of Islam". 
Sharan, P . Government .and_Poli t ics of I ran, (Metropolitan BooTc Co.~TPvtT7~LtH" New Delhi, 1933), 
pp . 21-22. 
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The king was not responsible to chambers for the 
decrees, and these decrees were put into force only after 
signed by the concerned minister. Ministers were appointed 
as well as dismissed by the decrees of the king. For 
being nominated as minister an Iranian origin including 
Muslim was the eligibility. The princes of the first 
degree i.e. the sons, brothers and the paternal uncles of 
the king could not be nominated as ministers. Ministers 
were responsible for their concern ministry' as well as 
collectively too for other policies of both the chambers 
(Majlis) . 
The Shah was not a dazzling public speaker, speeches 
were dull, He was too small to be imposing and did not seem 
to respond to meeting the people and 'pumping the flesh' , 
Rare public appearance was due to security fears. But in 
real sense it was not his genuine personality. He used to 
better in private and press interviews, a medium of 
expression he better enjoyed. Shah wanted to enjoy union 
with the people nostly by remote control. The Royal Family 
merribers used to be looked on the front pages of the press 
and television. His portrait deliberately posed as the 
Leader, the Father Figure -with the Empress and the crovm 
prince at the length and breadth of the country. In 1940s 
the U.S. ambassador wrote about him. 
"He is today of a mental maturity that belies his 
25 years. He is deeply distressed over the poverty and 
disease among his people, their low standard of living 
and bad vjorking conditions and appreciative of the fact 
that if Iranian patriotism is to be revitali^ced in order 
to stem the tide and appeal of communism, drastic and 
urgent steps must be taken to relieve the misery in his 
country. It is not true, he says, that Islam can be 
counted on to be immune to communism when hunger, disease 
and misery -are left unchecked" , 
It seems that Shah was willing to have a firm grip 
on it and e^ cercising all his power to control and lead a 
matter of conversation between Britisher and American. 
Allen, the U.S. ambassador, the Shah by 19'iS 
had became the most influential and popular figure 
in his country. He observed "He is continually being 
urged by Iranians to do something positive to remedy 
^ 7 
chaot ic p o l i t i c a l and economic condition of country. Yet 
he i s aviare t ha t these same I ranians , vjho today lav ish 
expressions of devotion to him, would be f i r s t to c a l l h i s 
d i c t a t o r i f he took any s teps vjhich affect them personal ly, 
and he des i r e s lega l ly-enacted c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment 
before pu t t ing pressure on Majlis to carry out i t s 
3 
functions" . Shah f led avjay and took asylum in Rome in 
1951, But suddenly the people army and the pol ice began to 
denounce Mossadegh and p r a i s e the Shah's regime. General 
Zahidi staged a successful coup and a r r e s t ed Mossadegh. 
On August 22, 1953 the Iranian radio broadcast the 
Mossadegh's f a l l and Shah's return to Tehran, This event 
•was ca l l ed the n a t i o n a l i s t r evo lu t ion . The army r e in s l a t ed 
Shah, After abdication of Reza Shah, f i r s t time he becam.e 
able to have a complete control over the country. 
Shah joined Baghdad Pact in 1955. I t was regarded 
the break of n e u t r a l i t y as he had declared to be neu t r a l 
during vxjrld wars. But t h i s proposi t ion i s a matter of 
controversy. At f i r s t place, t h i s proposi t ion d is regards 
between peacetime and wartime n e u t r a l i t y . At second i t 
assumes, tha t during world wars I r a n ' s pol icy was n e u t r a l . 
But i f vje look into the developments during the wars, in 
3 . Op, c i t , . Twentieth Century I r a n , , p , 6 6 . 
/ 
neither war Iran was capable to pursue consistently 
a neut ra l i s t foreign policy. 
The prewar tradit ion of th i rd power policy continued 
vmtill 1951, and only during the brief period of Mossadegh's 
govemniait an attempt was made to pursue a neut ra l i s t 
policy. So I ran ' s adherence to Baghdad Pact clearly 
abandoned i t s t radi t ion of third povjer policy as v;ell as 
neut ra l i s t policy of Mossadicist or other policy. He chose 
to ally with the west. I t became clearly evident that 
I ran ' s the foreign policy was in fact/ specially after the 
overthrow of Musaddiq's regime was Shah's foreign policy. 
I t showed the perception of Iranian position in the world 
polidtics. and the nature of Iranian problem and solution 
4 for tha t . 
During the Shah's stay out of Iran, whoever helped 
him in that critical years, were handsomely rewarded. 
General Nematollah Nassiri, latter head of SAVAK, was the 
man who delivered the message of dismissal of the Mossadegh 
4, Ramazani, R.K. Iran's Foreign Policy (1941-73) 
(University Press of Virginia, 1975), pp. 275-276. 
on 16th August 1953, Mohammad Khatemi, the p i l o t of the 
a i r c r a f t tha t flew the Shah out of Iran, became commander-
in-chief of the Air Force . He -was a main f igure in the 
armed fo rces . The persons vjho offered f inanc ia l 
a ss i s tance were well placed to get monopolies and c o n t r a c t s . 
Amir Hushang DavaloU/ ^xi important f igure r e l a t ed to Qaj ars 
put h i s funds a t the Shah's d i sposa l . He was rewarded to 
export caviar to Europe, But a t the same time persons who 
opposed were not forgiven, as Iremian Ambassador in 
Baghdad who t r i e d to a r r e s t Shah or the charge d ' a f f a i r s 
in Rome who refused to give h i s car key. 
Within the government, opposition removed from the 
way. Amini was the l a s t Prime Minister having some powers, 
And he wanted to control the Shah's heavy spending on 
militar^^ took an an t i - c o r r u p t ion i n i t i a t i v e . The removal 
of the iNational Front and opposition caused Amini's base 
sha t te red and became able to d i tch him in 196 3 . The 
Agricul ture minis ter Hassan Arsanjani who became much 
famil iar among the peasants on whose behalf the Land Reform 
vjas carrying, met with same f a t e . Whoever t roubled the 
Shah were el iminated e i t h e r in c i v i l i s e d or b r u t a l v?ay. 
General zahedi, played an important role in overthrovjing 
of Mossadegh and succeeded as loyal Prime Minister in 1953, 
subsequently obliged to leave for Geneva, The first head 
of SAVAK. General Bakhtiar took part in overthrow of 
Mossadegh, was in competence of Shah built,the most powerful 
organisation to SAVAK was dismissed in 1961, an year 
later invited to leave Iran and ei^ iled to Europe. He made 
association with Baathist government in Baghdad was eli-
minated by SAVAK in 1970 during hunting. 
In 196 3 Ayatollah Khomeini was arrested in Com which 
provoked the worst riots of the year throughout the 
country for three days. In reverse Shah ordered bloody law 
which estim.ated about 1000 killed or wounded by the army. 
Such furious suppression covjed the opposition particularly 
mullahs and their supporters. The mullah continued to 
protest most of them vjere arrested. Most of them faced with 
tough and heavy handed repression, even a number of 
educated elite preferred exile to alien countries. 
In 196 4 Ayatollah Khomeini was carried by Iranian 
police, put aboard a plane at military base, and was taken 
0 ± 
t o Turkey vhere with the cooperation the Turkish autho-
r i t i e s , was kept under house a r r e s t . SAVAK gave the s t a t e -
ments l i k e "since according t o r e l i a b l e information and 
suf f ic ien t evidence Mr. Khomeinei's a t t i t u d e and provo-
cat ions have been considered contrary t o the i n t e r e s t of 
the people and to the secur i ty , independence and t e r r i -
t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of the S ta te he has been exi led from Iran 
5 
with ef fec t from November 4, 1964", 
Therefore, i t appears t ha t e l i t e s who refused t o 
cooperate with the regime of Shah were subjected to demora-
l i z a t i o n or d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n , exi led from the country, .Such 
method of i so l a t ing opponents has a long h i s to ry and i t s 
fu l l development i s the product of tvjentieth century. By 
laiinching h i s "White Revolution he had throvn the opposi-
t ion in to confusion and demoralisation, appointed h i s own 
deput ies to the new c l a s s l e s s Maj l i s . He ea s i l y 
es tab l i shed f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with the major pov;ers. But 
Americans must have been t h r i l l e d with White Revolution. 
Zonis, Marvin. The P o l i t i c a l E l i t e of Iran, 
(Princeton Univers i ty Pre"ss, 197Ty#~P.44. 
D^ 
Russians must have been happy that the Shah defeated the 
actual potential American candidates for reformism,as well 
as the forces of feudalism, Britishers must have easy, 
looking that Shah still have his ovjn say. Oil will keep 
flowing and the evils of Mossadiqites subdued. All the 
powers remained in same friendly atmosphere with Shah, 
The Shah's active role for raising oil prices caused a 
serious clash of interest with the West, 
The White Revolution which began in 196 2 marked the 
end of western parliamentary system of democracy and the 
beginning of absolute monarchy. To Shah, revolution meaAt 
overv;helming support to his six-point referendum held on 
26th January 1963. were - (i) the abolition of landlord-
serf relationship (ii) nationalisation of the forest 
(iii) sale of government factories to pay for land reform 
(iv) amendment of the election law, including the enfran-
chisement of women (v) approval of workers sharing company 
profits (vi) establishment of literacy corps to facilitate 
6. Katouzian, Homa, The Political Econoim/ of Modern_ 
Iran (19 26-79), f^e McMillan Press Ltd.jLondon, 1981) 
Po 315. 
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compulsory education." ... The importance attached by the 
Shah to the refrendum result and his propagandist promotion 
of the idea that a revolution had taken place reveals an 
interesting ambivalence. At power politics. Shah accepted 
that strong authoritarian rule was essential. His idea was 
that to get thing done you need power, and to keep power 
you should not have to ask permission or advice from anyone', 
7 
this is matter of record, 
Majlis became almost a passive body within six 
months, it passed only two laws, refusing Soviet oil 
concession and approving provisional budget for eight weeks. 
The Shah wag much concerned in every details of 
army administration. In His Majesty's periodical tours 
throughout Persia, army was his chief concern. Due to this 
the morale of the army became very high, And in this 
field training continued and it became very effective in 
the regime. 
"^• Op. ,ci;t,, Iran. The Illusion of Power, p.7l. 
D t^ 
American Ass is tan t Secretary for Near Eastern and 
south Asian Affai rs , Alfred L. Atherton J u r . de l iver ing h i s 
idea about the Iranian leadership observed -
" I c r ed i t Iranian leadership for i t s considerable 
s k i l l and hard vjork in developing the land and t r a i n i n g 
i t s people so t ha t a l l I ranians v/ill in time have a b e t t e r 
l i f e . Because t h i s goal i s v io l en t ly opposed by both 
the extreme Left and extreme Right without regard for the 
r i gh t s of t h e i r vic t ims, there have been tunes tha t 
p rac t i ces and procedures to deal vjith t ha t opposit ion, which 
we could not approve for ourselves have taken p l a c e . B^t, 
when I place these in the broad c o n t e x t . . . I be l ieve tha t 
the advances vjhich have been made in improving the human 
r i gh t s of the broad majority of I r a n ' s population under 
considerable advers i ty for outweigh such abuses as have 
occurred in an attempt to control the v io len t challenges 
.. 8 to the govemmQ:it . The b i l a t e r a l t r e a t y of 1966 with 
the Soviet Union p o l i t i c a l l y gained several things to the 
Shah. For the small p r ice of l e t t i n g the Soviets have 
8 , Op, c i t . . Twentieth Century I r an . , p .90 . 
bo 
l imi ted access to I r a n ' s petroleum vjealth. Shah gained 
sovie t support and Moscow stopped the propaganda as well 
as backing against the Shah of cer ta in Iranian groups. 
Such Soviet support strengthened the Shah's regional and 
in t e rna t iona l p o s i t i o n . I t enabled him to improve h i s 
pos i t ion against Cairo and the Nasse r i t e forces in region 
as well as against I r a q . 
Looking the ro le played by monarchy p a r t i c u l a r l y 
by Pahlavis - the loyal parliament in 1976 voted for a nevj 
monarchy ca lender . The Islamic calender based on the 
Hejira year introduced by Reza Shah was a l t e r e d in favour of 
a system based on the coronation of Cyrus the Great 2^535 
years ago, :feyhan commented our Parliament thought 
i t f i t t i n g tha t the Iranian calender be based on such an 
omnipresent and i n t r i n s i c element of I r a n ' s his tory ' . The 
decision i t s e l f i s a lso a t r i b u t e to the Pahlavi dynasty 
in p a r t i c u l a r and to o ther dynast ies in the same c l a s s . 
Such change look the country in surpr i se and a considerable 
opposition looked among the mullahs. These mullahs 
p e r s i s t e d for old calender based on Hej i r a and sa id the 
change i s uncons t i tu t iona l and a cheap means by Shah 
exploi t ing pas t g l o r i e s of I r an , 
Do 
H i ^ l i g h t i n g h i s p o l i c i e s tovjards Europe, Persian 
Gulf and the Indian Ocean, the Shah said tha t I r a n ' s coope-
ra t ion -with the Europe made t h e i r economy s tab le in the 
vjay tha t they were able to supply t h e i r manufactured goods 
including technology to Middle East including Iran 
spec ia l ly to o i l producing countr ies as in such f i e l d s 
tha t these co\antries were lack ing . In h i s view I r a n ' s 
pol icy of un i ty and xinderstanding with the countr ies in the 
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean count r ies was based on 
common i n t e r e s t s and mutual respect of na t iona l r i g h t s . 
At the same time t h i s pol icy did not hinder in h i s 
p o l i t i c a l understanding with the "West, The highly 
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countr ies being powerful na t ions were led 
through s e l f - i n t e r e s t to reconsider t h e i r p o l i c i e s towards 
poor c o u n t r i e s . So he gave the idea t ha t the west, Soviet 
block and Middle Eastern o i l producers should un i t ed ly 
9 
work for the welfare of underdeveloped n a t i o n s . 
Shah denied tha t he wanted to make the people 
happy on h i s ovm terms. He asser ted tha t he wanted t o make 
Pahlavi . Mohammad Reza, (An Autobiograohy) 
The Shah' s Story, (Michael Joseph Ltd, , London 
198077 P . 154, 
the Iranian people happy despi te t h e i r cr iminal 
conspiracy. But the people -who were s p e c i a l i s t s in the 
f i e l d s of Sabotage, t e r ror i sm and in armed insur rec t ion , 
r e l i g ious fana t i cs having strange teachings vjhich vjere 
against the s p i r i t of Islam and even agains t t r a d i t i o n of 
the country^ combined against Shah's regime. I t vjas 
an a l l i ance of the Red and the Black v;ho engaged themselves 
in great de s t ruc t ion . 
J 
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CHAPTER - IV 
INTEBNATIONAL MILIEU 
The -world -war s e c o n d s t a r t e d i n 1 9 3 9 . The A x i s and 
A l l i e d f o r c e s were ±n t h e f i e l d s , Reza Shah vjas l a b e l l e d 
a s p r o - G e r m a n , I t a n t a g o n i s e d t h e A l l i e d p o w e r s p a r t i -
c u l a r l y R u s s i a and B r i t a i n , I r a n f a i l e d t o r e a l i s e t h a t 
above b o t h c o u n t r i e s may c e a s e h e r s o v e r e i g n t y i f t h e i r 
v i t a l i n t e r e s t s were a t S t a k e . H i t l e r a t t a c k e d S o v i e t 
Union i n 1 9 4 1 , A f t e r two months t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s moved 
1 
in I r a n and f o r c e d Reza Shah t o e x i l e . On J a n u a r y 29 , 1942 
B r i t a i n , t h e S o v i e t Union and I r a n s i g n e d a T r i p a r t i t e 
t r e a t y which s e t o u t t h e t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s b y wh ich 
B r i t a i n and R u s s i a r e m a i n e d i n I r a n d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of 
w a r . The U n i t e d S t a t e s , l a t e r in 1942 was i n v i t e d t o j o i n 
by I r a n , But Amer ica p r e f e r r e d n o t t o j o i n . A f t e r w o r l d 
war s e c o n d U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h d r e w by 3 l December 1945 and 
B r i t i s h f o l l o w e d on 2 March 1946, b u t t h e S o v i e t army d i d 
n o t w i t h d r a w from I r a n up t o mid 1946 . 
1 , Graham, R o b e r t , I r a n - The I l l u s i o n of Power , 
(Groom Helm, L o n d o n , ~ l 9 7 8 ) , p . 5 7 . 
D u 
Iran imraediate in post--war per iod requested with 
United S ta t e s for a s s i s t a n c e . United S t a t e s occupied a role 
in Iranian thinking s imi la r to German's in Reza shah ' s days. 
Iranian d i s t r u s t e d B r i t i s h e r s , Moreover, B r i t a i n ' s weakness, 
culminating in her departure from India in 1947, made a 
profound impress. 
United s t a t e s supported Shah agains t Soviet Union 
during 19 45-6 c r i s i s . The c r i s i s v/as r e l a t e d over two 
main i ssues with the Soviet Union, The f i r s t was the Soviet 
in ter ference in Azarbaijan and Kurdis tan, Secondly the 
Soviet withdrawal of forces from Iran a f t e r s ix months df 
the cessat ion of h o s t i l i t i e s , as required by the 1942 
T r i p a r t i t e Treaty of All iance between Iran, Br i ta in and 
Soviet Union. The republican movements in Azerbaijan 
f a i l e d . Dic ta tor Reza shah* s abdication freed the hands 
of o l iga rchy . Such ol igarchy s t a r t ed to reclaim t h e i r 
l o s t p r e s t i ge and property as well as the p e ^ n a l i s t i c 
r u l e . 
Majlis was composed of mostly o l igarchy and t h e i r 
suppor te rs . They wanted to maintain the S ta tus q\io. Foreign 
troops evacuated. I t caused economic depression. 
DX 
unemployment and frequent bankruptc ies . I t was the f i r s t 
time tha t Iran had an army of educated unenployed. High 
School, Univers i ty graduates and even s tudents from Europe 
returned home aimlessly vjalked on s t r e e t s for j o b s . But 
rad ica l groups of both r ight and l e f t p ressu r i sed Mohammad 
2 Reza Shah to r e c r u i t them, 
(a) Super Pov?ers' I n t e r e s t in Iran : 
In general context the pol icy of United S ta t e s 
towardSlran may be considered as t ha t of the Soviet Union, 
I t i s because Iran i s the bordering S t a t e of the Soviet 
Union. Soviet Union being a super power may threaten Iran 
at any time involving her own i n t e r e s t as done in p a s t . 
Thus^the United S ta t e s wanted to maintain Iranian 
independence. For p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c defence of 
American i n t e r e s t in the area i t was necessary to prevent 
Iran f a l l i n g under the Russian inf luence . Iran as a 
major o i l suppl ier in the region to the United States has 
the S t r a t eg i c importance for the United S t a t e s . The 
2 , Armj an i , Yahya, Middl^ East Past and P re sent , 
Prent ice Hall , Englewood Cliffs^1M .j ' l 1^707 P.428. 
unbridled arrns race in the area vjas a lso a matter of great 
concern not only for acquiring S t a t e s but for the suppl ie r 
S ta t e s e . g . United States.VIashington's i n t e r e s t in economic 
f i e l d was tha t she acquired ne\>; and expanding market for 
United S t a t e s ' non-mil i ta ry exports and cons i s ten t ly enjoyed 
a favourable balance of t rade in non-oi l sec to r . 
Hundreds of p r iva te companies did lucra t ive business with 
I r a n . I t s p r iva te investment ranked f i r s t among a l l o ther 
foreign powers. Thousands of American c i t i z e n s found work 
oppor tun i t i es in I r a n . 
The Russians were in favour of good r e l a t i o n s with 
Iran for both p o l i t i c a l and economic reasons . They needed 
Iranian gas and on favourable terms. Moscow wanted a 
share of I r a n ' s rapid ly growing market e spec ia l ly in v±e\i 
of t h e i r general foreign-exchange requirements for pur-
chase outs ide the S o c i a l i s t coun t r i e s . Soviet Union was 
i n t e r e s t ed in importing cer ta in o ther products mainly 
a g r i c u l t u r a l raw mater ia ls and bas i c consumer products from 
I r an . The de te r io ra t ing r e l a t i o n s with Chijna also conse-
quently r e f l ec ted Russian idea to make more cordia l 
r e l a t i o n s with neighbours as i t made with Iraq, Afghanistan 
and t rxed for I r an , 
Since i t had become obvious t ha t only a domestically 
strong secure Shah could normalize r e l a t i o n s -with U.S.S.R 
I t could enable Iran to reduce i t s dependence on the 
United S t a t e s . At t h i s jxoncture the Soviet i n t e r e s t vas 
to help him as soon as p o s s i b l e . Through t h i s MOSCOVJ could 
seek to achieve the following o b j e c t i v e s , 
1, To secure some access to Iranian resources p a r t i -
cu la r ly o i l , which was monopolized by the West. 
2 , To manifest i t s des i re for improved t i e s with the 
conservative Arab S ta tes and a t t r a c t t h e i r confidence, 
3 , To promote i t s general pol icy of good neighbourly 
r e l a t i o n s , peaceful co-existence and fr iendship with 
as many developing Afro-Asian count r ies as pos s ib l e . 
Although at tha t time Soviet Union did not need the 
o i l but i t wss economical for i t qui te apart from 
i t s need to strengthen to i t s i n t e rna t iona l 
bargaining p o s i t i o n . 
3 . Katouzian, Homa, The P o l i t i c a l Ecgnqmy of I-todem 
II^LA121§.Z221' (Macmilian Press London, 1981.), p.319 
4 . Saikal , Amin, The Rise and F a l l of the Shah, 
(Princeton Univer'si'ty Press , 198077 PP. 94-5 . 
In wartime/ Shah favoured the United S ta t e s as 
the t h i r d grea t power. Since Mohammad Reza Shah's 
accession to the throne of Iran in 1941, he favoured the 
growth of American i n t e r e s t and involvement in I r an , But 
with the b ipo la r i za t ion of in t e rna t iona l p o l i t i c s and the 
emergence of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the 
United Sta tes / the choice became much c lea r , he had the 
5 
side with the United S t a t e s . Shah v i s i t e d America in 
l a t e 1949, His cord ia l reception and favourable p res s , 
pointed out close r e l a t i o n s with U.S.A. He went to U.S.A. 
by P r e s i d e n t ' s personal plane and returned to Iran by Dutch 
a i r l i n e r . American government promised to support the 
Iranian request' for loan, if i t found economically j u s t i -
f i a b l e . United S ta t e s took much i n t e r e s t and supplied 
mi l i t a ry equipment. The reason behind t h i s was to prevent 
6 Iran, from being economically weak in Soviet camp. 
5 . Ramazani, R.K, 
I r a n ' s Foreign Policy (1941-73) 
Universi ty Press of Virginia , 19 75, p . 273. 
6 . 'Greaves Rose ' , The Reign of Mohammad Reza shah 
(1942-76), ' sadeghi . Amir, Twentieth Century Iran 
London, Heinemann, 1977, p , 7 l 
Prime Minister Mossadegh promised millenium, when 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n v;as to be completed a f te r ousting the o i l 
companies. Secretary of S ta te Dulles of U.S.A. repeatedly 
refused to re lease these d e t a i l s , under the pre text of 
involvement of foreign r e l a t i o n s of U.S. He s t a ted tha t 
exposure of d e t a i l s could be exploi ted by i r respons ib le 
elements contrary to the i n t e r e s t s of the United S t a t e s and 
i t s a l l i e s . He fur ther explained tha t Iran and several 
o ther count r ies had strong objection to the d i sc losure of 
cer ta in docuftAents r e l a t e d to the sett lement of o i l d i spu t e . 
Relat ions of Shah with the United S ta t e s dominated foreign 
pol icy during 1950s and ea r ly 1960s. The above r e l a t i o n s 
f e l l into tvjo major ca t ego r i e s , I r a n ' s general a l l i ance 
7 pol icy and i t s b i l a t e r a l re la taons with the United S t a t e s . 
During 1960-66, I ran-U.S. r e l a t i o n s were not 
harmonious. At the beginning of the decade, the Kennedy 
adminis t ra l sought to engage in 'Socia l engineering' in 
I r an . His mi l i t a ry and budgetary ass i s tance was for the 
creat ion of democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s , which he ought to 
become a major new U.S. expor t . Washington used i t s 
'^» Op. c i t . , I r a n ' s Foreign Policy (1941-73). 
PP. 274. 
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considerable economic leverage to d i c t a t e the s ize of 
I r a n ' s armed fo rces . These r e l a t i o n s improved during the 
Johnson adJninis t ra t ion. 
Iranian o i l production increased and the s t a b i l i t y 
of the regime vjas consolidated through land reform 
programme, and the government became more confident . In 
1964, Shah announced a nev? ' na t iona l independent foreign 
p o l i c y ' . I t intended to ensure i t s ovm i n t e r e s t s by seeking 
equidis tance from superpowers. But t h i s did not, for good 
p o l i t i c a l reasons, namely the need to balance Soviet 
geographical propij:iquily vjith c loser American p o l i t i c i a n 
t i e s , portend warm t i e s with >bscovj the declara t ion ref-
lec ted I r a n ' s in tent ion to judge o ther S ta tes by t h e i r 
cont r ibu t ions to her i n t e r e s t s . 
I r a n ' s s t rength increased during 196 7-73. The 
re l a t ionsh ip with the U.S.A. became one of enhanced 
influence and leverage . Relat ions with the Democratic 
adminis t ra t ion, 1964-68, improved. But the e lect ion of a 
Republican President in 1968 set the stage for g rea t e r 
warmth and understanding, I r a n ' s wi l l ingness and a b i l i t y 
to assume g rea te r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in assuring secur i ty in 
67 
the Persian Gulf meshed exact ly with Pres ident Nixon's 
June 1969 doctr ine of encouraging such t r end . Increased o i l 
revenues a f t e r February 1971 together with President 
iNixon's broad agreement to s e l l her sophis t i ca ted weapons-
8 
systems, set the stage for I r a n ' s current mi l i t a ry bu i ld -up . 
A ser ious c lash of i n t e r e s t s between the Shah and 
the west looked in h i s ac t ive role in ra i s ing o i l p r i c e s . 
Before 1973, he had already played the hawk in Conferences 
held in Teheran for pushing up o i l p r i c e s . But in 1973 
h i s double-edged manoevre did not jo in the Arab o i l s t r i k e . 
The non-consortium Iranian o i l auctioned at p r i ces of upto 
$ 17 b a r r e l , played a decis ive ro le in the fourfold p r ice 
increase tha t almost immediately followed. -He maintained 
such a t t i t u d e xontill 1977, when he declared tha t he would 
not push for an o i l p r ice increase in the forthcoming OPEC 
Conference. There must have been two reasons for t h i s 
change of a t t i t u d e ( i ) he had r e a l i s e d very be la ted ly 
tha t increasing expenditure were causing him more harm 
than good inside the country ( i i ) whether or no± he 
genuinely bel ieved tha t the Iranian Revolution was no 
8 . Op. c i t . , Twentieth Century Iran, 
pp . 198-200. 
more than an American p lo t in response to h i s o i l man ship, 
he imast have thought tha t in the circumstances, the offer 
of an o l ive branch to the west would be he lp fu l . Yet the 
Shah was the anti-communist policeman in the Persian Gulf 
who purchased the l a t e s t tanks, a i r c r a f t s , b a t t l e s h i p s , 
9 
atomic power s t a t i ons e t c , 
(b) I ran-Soviet Union Relation : 
I r a n ' s increasing inc l ina t ion tovjards west, m.arked 
the resumption of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with B r i t a i n . The 
sett lement of o i l dispute with Soviet Union and membership 
of Baghdad Pact, coupled with defence agreement with 
United S t a t e s pa ra l l e l ed towards Soviet Union by 
( l ) r e s i s t ance to Soviet p ressure , 
( i i ) suppression of the Tudeh Party and 
( i i i ) r econc i l i a t ion with Moscow. 
Resistance if necessary and r econc i l i a t i on if 
poss ib le , was the two-fold c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Iranian policy 
Op. c i t . , The P o l i t i c a l Economy of Modem Iran 
b d 
tov-'ards the Soviet Union. 
During 1946-50 relat ion bet-ween Iran and Soviet 
Union was a pa r t of r e f l ec t ion of the Soviet-American 
antagonism. I r a n ' s o\-m. re jec t ion of the Soviet o i l 
agreement marked the beginning of de t e r io ra t ion of t h e i r 
postvjar r e l a t i o n s . The Soviet pol icy toward Iran r e l a t e d 
to the nature and development of Irano-American r e l a t i o n s . 
Every Iranian move to increase American involvement in 
Iran was somehow regarded as an act d i r ec t ed against the 
secur i ty and i n t e r e s t of the Soviet Union. Iranian policy 
toward the Soviet Union in the post-FiQsaddeq era of 1950s 
was also a re f lec t ion of i t s ac t ions in response to Soviet 
po l i cy . Shah's at tempts to reconc i l i a t ion looked a.nev; 
Soviet approach of the p o s t - s t a l i n e r a . I t corresponded 
by Iran with the "peaceful co-existence". But the Soviet 
Union was pursuing a 'po l icy of in t imidat ion and i ng ra t i a -
t i o n . In ea r ly 1960s, I r a n ' s a b i l i t y to reach agreement 
with the Soviet Union was the pragmatic t h ru s t of Shah's 
10 foreign pol icy . 
10. Op. c i t . . The I r a n ' s Foreign Policy (1941-73). 
pp. 290-91. 
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Shah's decision to be an a l l y of Baghdad Pact on 
October 11,1955, became a matter of p r o t e s t by Soviet 
govemirent and the Press 'Sovie t government s t a t e d , tha t 
i t vjas a mi l i t a ry alignment. I r a n ' s alignment with t h i s 
pact vjas incompatible with the i n t e r e s t s of strengthening 
peace and secur i ty in the area of the Near and Middle East 
and contrary to Shah's good neighbouring r e l a t i o n s -with 
the Soviet Union, 
But Iran refuted the Soviet i n t e rp r e t a t i on of the 
Baghdad Pact and said tha t the objec t ive vas not o ther 
11 than of ensuring peace and secur i ty in the Middle Eas t ; 
Iranian government shovjed co rd ia l a t t i t u d e towards 
the Soviet Union and declared, tha t ( i) Iran was prepared 
to undertake in i t s pact with Soviet Union not to sign 
an agreement with the United S ta tes or any o ther t h i r d 
s t a t e , tha t posed a t h r ea t of aggression to the Soviet 
Union. ( i i ) Iran was prepared to undertake not to grant 
mi l i t a ry bases to the United S ta tes or any o ther t h i r d 
Sta te on i t s t e r r i t o r y , provided that the term "Mil i tary 
bases" was defined by mutual agreement in advance. 
11. i b id . , pp. 292-3. 
( i i i ) Iran would not allow the entry of the armed forces 
of the United S ta t e s or any other t h i r d S ta te into i t s 
t e r r i t o r y if t h a t entry was p r e jud i c i a l to the Soviet Union^ 
iinless Iran was a t tacked f i r s t . In re turn Iran would 
expect tha t the Soviet Union would renounce a r t i c l e s 5 and 
6 of the 19 21 t r ea ty , which empovjered Soviet Union to a 
d i sc re t ion to intervene m i l i t a r i l y in Iran as she did in 
1941. And Soviet Union wi l l extend subs t an t i a l economic 
and techn ica l a id to I r a n . 
The Shah's above offer had the tv.o main goals behind 
i t . F i r s t , t o p ressu r i se United S ta t e s to come througl^ 
with a more comprehensive commitment to a more a generous 
economic and m i l i t a r y a id . American non-member ship to 
Baghdad Pact wi'IL f o s t e r i t s membership. Second, I r a n ' s 
entry into negot ia t ion with the Soviet Union aimed to 
secure Soviet commitment to nonaggression and extensive 
Soviet economic technica l a id without abandoning i t s past 
12 or fu ture ties with the United S t a t e s , 
In Ju ly 196 3, Irano-Soviet agreement was signed in 
Teheran for technica l and economic cooperation in the 
12. i b id . , p . 298 
construct ion of hydroe lec t r ic dams. I t follovjed a s e r i e s 
of o ther pro tocols concerning a i r t r anspor t a e r i a l 
photography. Another agreement v?as also signed for the 
exchange of a Soviet s t ee l plant for Iranian gas . However, 
I r a n ' s t rade share with the Soc ia l i s t count r ies v;as s t i l l 
v e r y ' l i m i t e d . I t was p a r t l y because of the Shah 's much 
close r e l a t i o n s with the west, p a r t l y because of h i s need 
for western advanced technology. Russians were at^xious to 
f u l f i l the Iranian requirements as food but could not get 
western l ike Japanese, German and American consumer products 
ranging from motor-cars and e l ec t ron ic equipment to 
cookers and r e f r i g e r a t o r s were b e t t e r in qua l i ty and lower 
in p r i c e . Shah's growing economic cooperation with the East 
was p o l i t i c a l l y symhx)lic, and promised b e t t e r prospects 
13 for future commercial r e l a t i o n s with western c o u n t r i e s . 
In l a t e r 1960s Soviet Union t r i e d to conclude agree-
ments with Iran, but f a i l e d . Shah could not t r u s t the 
Sov ie t s . I t was s t i l l domestically weak, Soviet Union 
supported ac t i ve ly the outlavjed Tudeh par ty against Shah's 
13 Qp^ p i t . . The P o l i t i c a l Economy of ^iDdem Iran 
7l926-79)^ p . 320. 
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regime. But Shah's S ta te v i s i t to Moscow from June 21 :to 
Ju ly 3, 1965 re su l t ed in tvw major economic and military-
agreements. The f i r s t was concluded in January 1966 . 
Iran agreed to supply the Soviet Union with more than $ 600 
mill ion worth of na tu ra l gas, beginning in 1970, in return 
USSR undertook to bu i ld I r a n ' s f i r s t l a rge s t e e l mil l 
complex in Fsfahan, construct a p ipe l ine from northern 
Iran to Caucasus and e s t ab l i sh a machine too l p lant in 
Shi raz . Under the second agreement i n i t i a t e d in February 196 7, 
the Soviets agreed to supply Teheran with some $ 110 million 
worth of arrroured troops c a r r i e r s , t rucks , and a n t i a i r c r a f t 
14 guns in return for na tura l gas from I r a n . 
I r a n ' s b i l a t e r a l pjxiject about n a t u r a l gas and s t ee l 
mi l l gave a r ea l sense to the Soviet slogan, ' f r o n t i e r s of 
peace and good ne ighbour l i ne s s ' . Even I r a n ' s condemnation 
of the Soviet involvement into Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
establishment of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with China in 19 71 
did not a l t e r t h i s . I t remained upto l a t e r period a correc t 
commercial r e l a t i o n s for emergence of a more se l f -conf ident 
14. Op. c i t . . The Rise and F a l l of the Shah, p . 9 5 . 
y 
I r a n , Iran became ac t ive in regional diplomacy, d ive r s i f i ed 
her t ieS/ launching i n i t i a t i v e s / acce le ra t ing her arms 
purchases as well as deepening her r e l a t i onsh ip v;ith the 
15 West. 
But Irano-Soviet r e l a t i ons have been s t ra ined on a 
number of i s s u e s : -
( l) I r a n ' s arms bui ld-up; ^bscov.' argued was excessive 
for self-defence and provoked a regional arms race, serves 
the i n t e r e s t s of ex terna l powers and wastes valuable 
resources , 
( i i ) I r a n ' s mi l i t a ry ass is tance in response to a request 
by the Omani government, was charac ter ized as in tervent ion 
in support of Russian reac t ion . 
( i i i ) Shah's suggestions for an Indian Ocean common Market 
conf l ic t ing with FJOSCOW'E proposal for an Asian co l l ec t ive 
secur i ty arrangement tha t would include the USSR. Similar ly 
the enlarged RCD suggestion. 
(vi) Soviet ass i s tance to the Dhofari rebe ls , to Libya, 
led to encouraging te r ror i sm within Iran . Her na-^al 
bu i ld up in the Indian Ocean, poss ible involvement in 
16, Op, c i t . Twentieth Century^ I ran , p , 200. 
7 J 
Baluchistan, VJ^S a source of conceim to I r a n . I r a n ' s 
increased m i l i t a r y involvement with the US such as F-14' s, 
her naval bui ld-up, continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n in CENTO and 
her planned nuclear energy programme were concerned to 
USSR. 
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CHAPTER - V 
REGIONAL SUPREMACY 
The p r e s e n t c h a p t e r aims a t examining t h e main 
o b j e c t of Mr, Mohammad Reza Shah ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y and 
r e l a t i o n s wi th superpowers . He was wel l aware of the f a c t , 
tha t the region as a whole was lagging behind in a l l 
spheres, whether i t was a question of foreign pol icy or 
i n t e rna l po l i cy . Keeping in view these f a c t s h i s main aim 
was to maintain h i s supremacy in the region and to strengthen 
the country as a whole by es tab l i sh ing foreign r e l a t i o n s with 
superpowers. Therefore, the present study wi l l d iscuss in 
d e t a i l the varying agreements of Shah with regard to h i s foreii^n 
policy which gained h i s supremacy in the b e l t . 
Shah v i s i t e d England in 1948 for the purpose of 
seeing the s c i e n t i f i c and i n d u s t r i a l techniques there . His 
aim was to modernize the country applying the same technique 
for the advancement in respect ive f i e l d s . 
On 1st February, 19 49, government of Iran contracted 
with Overseas Consultants Inc (OCI), The object was to 
survey. The economic problems and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of I r a n . 
Overseas Consultants I nc . (OCI) submitted 
/ J 
22nd August, 1949. It was revealed in the report that, 
"the mass of Iranian people themselves offer the greatest 
hope for a fundamental reform". The people have atleast 
five outstanding educational assets, a high tradition of 
culture, a developed craftmanship, a great appreciation of 
beauty, a high natural intelligence, and an intellectual 
inquisitiveness. As opposed to these desirable character-
istics, we found that there were certain undesirable ones 
existed ... We felt weaknesses exist in standards of public 
honesty, in tendencies to seek an excuse or Scapegoat, and 
preoccupation with short range plans and exorbitant profits, 
in depreciation of physical labor, in lack of personal 
initiative and dependence on the Government, in an extreme 
social stratification, and in uncritical acceptance of 
foreign social patterns." 
The above report gave emphasis on the need of exten-
sive development in agriculture, in which about eighty per 
cent people were engaged, with sufficient health facilities 
and reforms in the field of education. 
1. 'Greaves, Rose. "The Reign of Mohd. Reza Shah, 
(1942-76)", Sadeghi, Amir. Twentieth Century Iran, 
(Hein^nann, London 1978), pp. 66-7. 
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Iran became the meniber of Baghdad Pact on 24 February, 
1955. I t was o r i g i n a l l y es tab l i shed for both mi l i t a ry and 
economic o rgan iza t ion . But the emphasis was given much on 
mi l i t a ry aspect r a the r than economic aspec t . The object 
was to prevent communist expansionism. But i t became c lear 
to i t s member S t a t e s tha t t h i s regional organisa t ion i s not 
of great value , un less the Soviet Union invaded one of 
them. Shah s t ressed on i t s importance not because of i t s 
mi l i t a ry a l l i a n c e , but because i t could fos t e r cooperation 
and understanding in non-mil i tary f i e l d s . I t l a t e r named 
CENTO in 1959. 
* 
President Eisenhower v i s i t e d Iran on December 14, 1959 
He spoke of I r a n ' s v i t a l ro l e in the defense-of free world. 
His v i s i t was pr imar i ly intended to s t i f f en the b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s in defiance of Soviet a t t i t u d e . He fur ther said. 
Yon has borne the force of a powerful propaganda a s sau l t ; 
at the same time You have been working to improve the l iving 
standards in your na t ion . Further said, we cannot abandon 
our mutual e f fo r t s to bu i ld b a r r i e r s , such as the peaceful 
b a r r i e r of our Central Treaty Organization (CEMTO), against 
the p e r s i s t e n t dangers of aggression and subversion. This 
a l l i ance i s important in preserving s t a b i l i t y and secur i ty 
2 in the area and recognized t h e i r usefu lness . 
I ran , Pakistan and Turkey in Ju ly 1964 announced the 
formation of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) . 
The object of t h i s organisa t ion was not to oppose CENTO 
a l l i ance , but an improvement of cooperation in economic, 
3 
technica l and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s . 
I r a n ' s arms build-up accorded -with the Nixon's 
Doctrine of Se l f - re l i ance for the coun t ry ' s defence. Shah's 
diplomatic r e l a t i o n s in the Sub-continent and Sponsorship 
of Persian Gulf Securi ty System, ass is tance to Oman, helped 
United S t a t e s ' s involvement. I r a n ' s pol icy towards the 
Middle East acted as a bridge among Egypt, Syria and the 
United S t a t e s . The U.S. dependence on Iran caused influence 
on i n t e rna t i ona l p o l i t i c s . Due to t h i s U.S.A. had a f r i end ly 
2 . Ramazani, R.K. I r an ' s Foreign Policy (1941-73), 
(Universi ty Press of Virginia , 1975), pT^SS . 
3 , Sa ika l , Arain. The Rise and Fa l l of the .,Shah, (Princeton Univers i ty Press, Princeton 1980), 
pp. 93-4 . 
moderate S ta te having S t r a t eg i c importance in the Persian 
Gulf, V?ithin Iran i t was evident tha t U.S.A. was involved 
in f i e l d s e . g . mi l i t a ry , personnel/ education t r a i n i n g , 
technology, commerce, medicine, housing, ag r i cu l tu re and 
nuclear energy. Due to the inc l ina t ion towards the VJest, 
4 Shah looked an important r u l e r in the reg ion . 
Shah viewed the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s in s t r a t e g i c 
terms, and t h i s was an unique fea ture among Persian Gulf 
S t a t e s . I r a n ' s regional i n i t i a t i v e s , i n t e r e s t in NATO's 
Southern f lank, Mitual Balanced Force Reductions t a l k s in 
Vienna and in Southern Sea were outgrowth of such s t a t e s . 
I t s increased s t r a t e g i c l inkages of numerous i n t e rna t i ona l 
o rganisa t ions l i k e OPEC, RCD,.CENTO and Pa r i s based North-
South conferences played a p ivo ta l ro le in diversed 
s i t u a t i o n s . 
Policymakers of Iran were in search of a leading ro le 
This ro le necessa r i ly based on a degree of s e l f -p r e se rva t i on . 
Iranian government denied of being a developing country and 
did not seek the l abe l 'non-aligned*, His d i v e r s i f i e d t i e s . 
4 . 'Chubim^ - Sharairi' 
" I r a n ' s Foreign Policy, 1960-76", 
Sadeghi, Amir. Twentieth Century Iran, 
(Heinenann, London 1977), p .213 . "" 
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diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e s , per cap i ta foreign aid, broader 
secur i ty perimeter and mi l i t a ry bui ld-up, were the s igns 
of an ac t ive ro l e in the region.Shah recovered throne with 
the help of United S ta tes and consolidated h i s power at 
home. He kept cont ro l over cen t ra l government and mul t i -
ple e thn ic c u l t u r a l , r a c i a l groups. At the same time he 
enjoyed personal and na t iona l secur i ty with American help 
Br i t i sh forces l e f t the Persian Gulf a f te r world war I I . 
This gap was f u l f i l l e d by biixon's doct r ine to pro tec t the 
r eg ion ' s s t a b i l i t y and secur i ty and i t su i ted very much to 
Shah's i n t e r e s t . He extended I r a n ' s secur i ty perimeter 
beyond the Persian Gulf . I t was upto the Gulf of Oman and 
north-west quadrant of Indian Ocean in 1972. He wanted to 
put Iran in to a major regional maritime power. For t h i s 
plan he constructed a huge naval base at Chahbahar, the 
S t ra teg ic S t r a i t of Hormuz. United S t a t e s claimed Iran as 
5 her policeman m the reg ion . 
Shah said tha t as a par t of Western democratic system. 
So l ida r i t y with European par tners was also very r e a l . For 
example the quantum of trade the sale of o i l , import of raw 
5 , . Ramazani, R.K., The United St_atej_and^Irjn, 
(Praeger Publisher , l^a^J'pJZI, 
mater ia l s , o rders for large construct ion v»rk grew. The 
government b u i l t second main gas p ipe l ine to carry t h i r t e en 
thousand mil l ion cubic metres of gas a year to the Russian 
f r o n t i e r . He claimed tha^ he had the rese rves of gas which 
•will be enough for 300 y e a r s . 
He became the partner in f irms l i ke Bacock and Krupp, 
h i s idea vjas to enter into agreements with the firms of 
i n t e rna t i ona l s tandard. He wanted to make Iran to be par t 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l management through having a good u l t r a -
modern technology. In the f i e l d of petro-chemistry the best 
6 
r e s u l t was achieved during the Shah's regime. 
The Shah of Iran published a took e n t i t l e d 'Toward a 
New C i v i l i z a t i o n ' , The book discussed about White Revolution 
in Iran and the Land d i s t r i b u t e d to 15 per cent of the 
peasants . A large number of dams had been b u i l t . The 
country had been i n d u s t r i a l i z e d . Roads had been b u i l t 
connecting the d i f fe ren t pa r t s of the country. The Univer-
s i t i e s were es tab l i shed , l iving standard r a i s e d . Through 
Iranian Airways, he connected country with c a p i t a l s of Europe 
6 . Pah 1 avi , M,R. 52}^_^hah^j_Storj^, 
(Michael Joseph Ltd . , London" 1980J pp. 153-54. 
and Asia. He -was named Aryamehr by the Senate, -which 
means "Sun of the Aryans" , The White Revolution strengthened 
the posi t ion of Iran in the Middle Eas t , I t also enhanced 
the image of Iran among t 3 vrarld n a t i o n s . Iran, as an 
American policeman in the Gulf, received the weapons i t needed 
for the Gulf defence. From 1950 to 1970 Shah purchased 
American arms worth $ 1.8 b i l l i o n . During 1971 to 1978 Shah 
spent add i t iona l $ 18,1 b i l l i o n on vieapons. 
Shah being strong enough occupied Abu Misa, g rea te r 
Tumb and l e s se r Tumb belonging to Sharjah, forced I raq to 
agree to Shat t -a l -Arab agreement of 1975 at Algiers , helped 
Qabus, Sultan of Oman against the l e f t i s t insurgents in 
Dhofar reg ion . 
Soviet Union b u i l t a s t e e l mi l l in Esfahan in exchange 
for Iranian na tu ra l g a s . Br i t i sh , French, Germans and o the r s 
contracted for, bui lding of f a c t o r i e s , roads, ships, docks, 
7 
mi l i t a ry bases and many other t h ings . 
Shah made a repressed s t a b i l i t y , in which he carefu l ly 
watched, nursed and cont ro l led in a way where l e s t power 
7, Armiani, Yahya. M,S, Past and Present , 
(Prent ice Hall , Englewood Clif f s N . J . 1970), - .^p, 437-38 
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challenge may be al lowec. He received reasonable success 
to e l iminate i l l i t e r a c y including r u r a l poverty which was 
h i s key step towards modernism. Univers i ty education became 
the most important aspect ' n a t i o n ' s f u t u r e . A person 
could be t o l e r a t e d upto the extent not to question about the 
8 
regine or not to c r i t i c i s e the regime. 
Being an absolute r u l e r , he wished the subjects to be 
s i l en t about h i s leadership and p o l i c i e s . He cont ro l led 
o i l resources , undertook speedy c a p i t a l i s t o r i en ted devel-
opments. He emphasdsed the need of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and 
sizeable modern armed f o r c e s . Shah strengthened I r a n ' s 
regional and i n t e r n a t i o n a l pos i t ion , cu l t i va t ed global pres-
t i g e for himself as the 'king of k i n g s ' , ' l i g h t of the Aryans' 
His ab jec t ive on one side was to make monarchy strong and to 
9 bui ld a strong, prosperous and independent Iran on the o the r . 
S.VJ.G, Benjamin the f i r s t American minis ter in Teheran 
did forecas te tha t if Iran become free from foreign influence. 
8 , Grahajn Robert, Iran (The I l l u s ion of Power), 
CCroora "Eielm, 1973") , ' p " . 2"08 . 
9 . Saikal , Arain. The Rise arcJFall of the Shah, 
(Princeton Press , 1980) ;p'.203 . 
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wi l l achieve na t iona l g r e a t n e s s . I t was looked during the 
Shah's t h i r t y f ive years of r u l e . The year 1976 was fa r 
d i f f e ren t from Iran of St -.end Vtorld War, Cr i t ic ism of 
fellow I ran ians due to fo; .^ gn associa t ion was in fashion. 
During sevent ies I r a n ' s r e l a t i o n s with I raq and Egypt were 
10 improved, I r a n ' s l imi ted o i l suppl ies , coupled with her 
growing needs for revenue made her na t i ona l i n t e r e s t s very 
d i f fe ren t from tha t of Saudi Arabia and o the r covin t r i e s 
of the reg ion . 
10. Greaves, Rose, The Reign of Mohaironad Reza Shah 
1942-76, HosseinT Twentieth Century" I ran, 
(Heineraann, London 1978), pp . 90 -91 . 
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CHAPTER - VI 
IRAN'S FOREIGN . POLICY 
( 1941-79 ) 
I r an h a s undergone a s i g n i f i c a n t s t r u c t u r a l s h i f t s 
from a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r to a d i v e r s i f i e d , f a s t moving 
i n d u s t r i a l and s e r v i c e s s e c t o r . They f i r s t c o n c e n t r a t e d 
on du rab le and non-durab le consumer goods . The c o u n t r y ' s 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n extended to i n t e rmed ia ry p r o d u c t s e . g . 
s t e e l / aluminium/ pe t rochemica l s / end even c a p i t a l goods 
a s motor v e h i c l e s , machine t o o l s and machinery e t c . I t 
could become p o s s i b l e on ly a f t e r adop t ing a very b a l a n c e 
fore ign p o l i c y in a l l f i e l d s . 
Throughout the S h a h ' s r e i g n , h i s main o b j e c t i v e .was 
to advance t h e count ry and e r a d i c a t e backwarciness in a l l 
f i e l d s , For such goa l s / he c o n t a c t e d most ly vjith western 
c o u n t r i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y Americans fo r t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n . Even 
though he made agreement wi th Sov ie t Union t o o . Through a 
number of agreements , he became a b l e to r e c e i v e c o n c e s s i o n s , 
a i d and loan e t c . In exchange he e x p o r t e d o i l and o t h e r 
consumer goods to those c o u n t r i e s . Through d i f f e r e n t a g r e e -
ments the fo re ign economic p o l i c y of t h e p e r i o d w i l l 
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become c l e a r . From the s t a r t of h i s reign in 19 41 the 
Shah had experienced the hazards of B r i t i s h monopoly of the 
Iranian o i l industry/ which had minimized I r a n ' s b e n e f i t s 
from i t s ovn resources and made the country' vulnerable to 
outside in ter ference a t the same t ime. He had seen tha t 
these e f f ec t s l imi ted and f ru s t r a t ed many Iranian govern-
ments in t h e i r at tempts to implement reforms and s t a b i l i z e 
the domestic s i t ua t ion , on the one hand, and to exerc ise 
grea ter independence in the conduct of I r a n ' s foreign a f f a i r s . 
1 
on the o t h e r . 
I r a n ' s p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c importance for sup'er-
powers was very much. Americans stand was tha t they wanted 
to prevent Iran from f a l l i n g under Soviet domination and 
have a source of o i l supply. In June 1947 the United S ta t e s 
agreed to a c r ed i t $ 25 mil l ion for the purchase of surplus 
ma te r i a l s . But the Iranian Parliament r e s t r i c t e d the 
1. Saikal , Amin. The Rise and F a l l of the Shah, 
Princeton Universi ty Press , 1980, p , 97, 
purchasing authority to $ 10 million. The American congress 
later authorised an additional $ 16 million to cover the 
costs of purchase. Thus they could use the total credit 
upto $ 26 million. However, Iran had purchased material 
wDrth $ 5,2 million with an original cost of $ 26,5 
2 
million, 
In a speech on 1 April 1950, Shah hinted a t I r a n ' s 
need of more arms. The country needed soc ia l l e g i s l a t i o n and 
agrarian reform. Ali Mansur to ld the Majl is t ha t he hoped 
for American f inanc ia l aid, and h i s government had dravn up 
a comprehensive statement of I r a n ' s need. The government 
of Iran appealed to Pres ident Truman for urgent American 
a s s i s t a n c e . Nevertheless , in October 1950, Grady U.S. 
ambassador v i s i t e d Iran and Razmara Iranian Prime Minister 
signed the agreement which implemented point four of 
3 Truman's inaugural address of January 1949. 
Through point four programme of Pres ident Trumar, Iran 
'Greaves, Rose ' . "The Reign of Mohanunad Reza shah"(l942-'|6 
sadeghi. Amir Twentieth century Iran (London, Heineniann 1977), p . 6 5 . 
3 . i b i d . , p . 71 
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received more aid than any country in the Middle East or 
Africa except Turkey. I t v?as l a rges t in s i z e . From 1952 
to 196 2, United S t a t e s had betvjeen 200 and 300 personnel 
each year in I r a n . This programme has been s t ronly pra ised 
and j u s t as s trongly c r i t i c i z e d by exper ts in the f i e l d to 
Iranian regime considering the vast expenditure of rroney 
and manpower Iran should have benef i t t ed more than i t d id . 
Perhaps the most important cause of i t s shortcoming was the 
fact tha t mi l i t a ry and s t r a t e g i c cons idera t ions usua l ly out-
weighed economic and socia l ones . 
United S t a t e s mi l i t a ry aid to Iran had always close 
linked/ in purpose and execution, with i t s economic a i d . 
The whole purpose of American aid was to enable the monarchy 
to defend i t s e l f against foreign mainly Soviet aggression 
and domestic oppos i t ion . With the establishment of the 
Gendarmerie, the S ta te po l ice , American mission began to 
v i s i t Iran to enhance the eff ic iency of army and p o l i c e . 
On 23,May, 1950 Iran signed with United S t a t e s a 
Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, and the Mi l i t a ry 
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) v?as formed. I t was an 
J 
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extension of the Truman Doctrine aimed a t the in t e rna l 
securi ty/ not the na t iona l defence of I r a n , In return Iran 
promised to f a c i l i t a t e the production and t ranspor t of 
rav) and semiprocessed mater ia l s required by the United 
S t a t e s . Thus,Iran acce lera ted i t in 1960s and 1970s as o i l 
4 for arms s a l e . Mossadegh came into power an 1951 . His 
government bel ieved in a revolut ionary method, and the Shah's 
regime favoured an evolutionary method, s t i pu l a t ing t h a t 
I r a n ' s sovereignty over i t s o i l industry should be achieved 
gradually through accommodation ra the r than confrontation 
vjith the West, 
Mossadegh made a misca lcu la t ion . He bel ieved tha t the 
Americans, who had no stake in the Anglo-Iranian o i l company, 
vjould support na t iona l i sm. This be l i e f was based on 
American resentment of B r i t a i n ' s role in the jregion and the 
influence flowing from Br i t i sh involveman t in Anglo-1 radian 
o i l company. His misreading of the scene was not e n t i r e l y 
h i s own fau l t as the American Ambassador in Teheran, Henry 
Grady, encouraged h i s view. In the event the Americans 
sided with the Br i t i sh , a t f i r s t merely to ensure tha t 
4, .Armajani, Yahya, Middle East P.^st and Present , 
(Prent ice Hall, Englewood C l i f f s , 1970), pp. 434-35, 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n did not work. Then, as they feared the 
Soviet Union might explo i t the s i tua t ion and the outlawed 
Tadeh Party gain ground in Iran, they considered the more 
d r a s t i c solut ion of overthrowing Mossadegh. This v?as 
prefe3:red to d i r e c t mi l i t a ry i n t e rven t i on . 
Mossadegh compounded h i s d i f f i c u l t i e s by f a i l i n g 
to see the problems of se l l ing o i l in a c a r t e l market. By 
the same token he under-estimated the economic consequences 
of the l o s s of o i l revenue. Thus the euphoria of n a t i o n a l i -
sation favoured him so long as na t i ona l i s a t i on was seen to 
be working. As time dragged by without the expected r e s u l t s , 
people became impatient, and the conservative elements, who 
for the n a t i o n a l i s t i c reasons had applauded the move, were 
turned agains t him by propaganda tha t he was encouraging the 
communists. Indeed as conservative support wan3d, so he had 
to lean more on S o c i a l i s t and communist minded. I t was also 
a n a t u r a l , though dangerous, bargaining move to threaten 
the Br i t i sh and Americans with a c lose r Soviet a l l i ance - h i s 
only area of diplomatic manoeuvre, 
Mossadegh l o s t out not merely because h i s moves were 
poorly planned. He understimated the s t r e n g t h of the 
opposit ion and did not had suf f ic ien t support within armed 
5 fo rces . 
In 1960s Br i ta in vjas quickly replaced by America as 
the dominant 'western povjer and influence in I r a n . Br i ta in 
l o s t t h e i r raonopoly of south Iranian o i l , the American could 
afford to spend and America had l e f t her pre-war i so la t ionism 
to pl^y ^ f u l l global ro le in the free world, Br i ta in 
rapidly l o s t her subs tan t i a l share of the Iranian market, 
i t was purely and simply because she f a i l e d to compete, not 
so much with Americans as with, e spec ia l ly the Vtest Germans 
f i r s t , and the Japanese l a t e r . In 1960s Br i ta in man aged, to 
obtain a la rge share of the Iranian assembly-plant car produc-
t ion, in which the Americans and the French were the o ther 
l e s s s ign i f i can t supp l i e r s . 
When the rapid growth of o i l revenues began the 
absolute amount of B r i t a i n ' s exports to Iran also grew. The 
single most luc ra t ive B r i t i s h export was chieftan tanks 
which the Shah eagerly brought becau^ these v;er^ the nost 
5 , Graham, Robert, Iran, The I l l u s ion of Power, 
(London, Croom Helm 1978), pp" 66-57. 
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advanced armoured weapons of t h e i r type^ but in addi t ion 
Bri ta in annually exported to Iran a va r i e ty of manufacturing 
and a g r i c u l t u r a l products, the t o t a l value of which 
anounted to no l e s s than $ 971 mill ion in 1977-8. Br i ta in 
had a s izeable share of the Iranian market in f i nanc i a l and 
o ther services , in which she competed successful ly in the 
in te rna t iona l market, Br i ta in had bene f i t t ed from large 
o f f i c i a l and p r iva te Iranian depos i t s and investments since 
the oi l - revenue explosion. 
In the f i e l d of Iranian economic r e l a t i o n s , no 
country not even America, was a successful as Germany an*d 
Japan, The conclusion of the war had reduced Germany's 
previously la rge share of I r a n ' s t rade to n e g l i g i b l e pro-
por t ions , but she quickly began to recover the l o s t ground 
in the 1950s, increased her share in the 1960s, and ended 
by supporting about 20 per cescit of I r a n ' s non -c l a s s i f i ed as 
well as a la rge share of her c l a s s i f i e d imports in the 1970s. 
In addi t ion, she supported through f inanc i a l and t echn ica l 
seirvices to Iran, and benef i t t ed from a l a rge share of 
Iranian depos i t s and foreign investment. The o f f i c i a l 
investment in the Krupp heavy- indus t r ia l complex must be 
regarded as one of h i s Majesty 's g r e a t e s t f o l l i e s in the 
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f i e l d of foreign investment. He paid about $ 800 m. of the 
count ry ' s c a p i t a l for j u s t over 25 per cent of the shares 
of t h i s famous company and i t s subs id i a r i e s , which mainly 
produce decl ining products, such as s t e e l and suffered from 
6 high running c o s t s . 
In 1953, Shah was r e i n s t a l l e d with the help of CIA 
which gave $ 10 mill ion to buy some g e n e r a l s . Prime 
Minister Massaddiq was a r r e s t ed , Americans supplemented to 
B r i t i s h e r s in a new role of a p ro tec to r and guarantor . Within 
a nonth of Mossadegh's f a l l , Eisen^hower had approved $ 45 
mil l ion in emergency economic a i d . Between 1949 and 1952 
Anerica extend to Iran a t o t a l of $ 500 mil l ion in g ran t s 
and loans of which one-fourth was earmarked for the m i l i t a r y . 
American a id and technica l ass i s tance e s t ab l i shed the 
secur i ty agency SAVAK in 1957. This organisa t ion was a lso 
a s s i s t e d by I s r a e l i in te l l igence service , Mosad, He had 
already turned to the I s r a e l i s for the provision of h i s 
personal secur i ty a f t e r deciding tha t the o u t s i d e r s were 
7 
more e f f i c i en t and trast\NDrthy. 
6 , Katouzian, Homa, The P o l i t i c a l Economy of Modem 
Iran (19 26-79) (The Macmillan Press , London 1981)7 
pp . 320-21";" 
7. Op. c i t . , ;iran. .The.Illusion_of Power, p , S8 . 
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I r a n ' s e f f o r t s to s e t t l e o i l d ispute -with Br i ta in 
were b a s i c a l l y aimed by America to hold o i l monopolies of 
Iran over Br i ta in in the Middle Eas t . Soviet Union 
commented tha t such ef for t was to draw Iran into a western-
sponsored a l l i ance . sys tem in the Middle E a s t . I zves t i a 
of March 3, 1954 s ta ted tha t the plan for e s t ab l i sh ing the 
o i l consortium, " i s a de f in i t e r e s u l t of the s t ruggle to 
r e d i s t r i b u t e I r a n ' s o i l resources to the American monopolies 
advantage and to B r i t i s h monopolies' detripient" . In Teheran 
on August 5, 1954 Pravda claimed tha t the consortium 
arrangements represented an attempt to place the Iranian o i l 
industry under the control of western o i l companies. I t 
8 
also represented an attempt to control I r a n ' s e n t i r e economy. 
The downfall of Musaddiq in 1953 was preceeded by the 
death of S t a l i n . Now the Zahidi government took hold in 
I r an . I t coincided with the Soviet pol icy of peaceful 
co-ex is tence . Soviet Union offered Iran three concessions 
within a week. F i r s t in the l a s t week of June and ear ly 
Ju ly 1954, offered to re lease some three hundred c i t i z e n s 
8 , Ramazani R.K. I r a n ' s Foreign Policy (19 41-73), 
(Universi ty P re l s of Virginxa 19757, pp . 291-92. 
long detained in the Soviet Union. Second to turn over 
to Iran the inac t ive i n s t a l l a t i o n s of an o i l coinpany a t 
Pahlavi and o ther northern c i t i e s and t h i r d to nego t ia te 
ancient boundary problems, including to turn over to Iran 
some eleven tons of long-overdue gold and goods vorth 
$ 8 mi l l ion . 
The Eisenhower Doctrine of January 5, 1957 author ised 
the pres iding to employ American armed forces as he deemed 
necessary to p ro tec t the i n t e g r i t y and independence of any 
nat ion or group of na t ions in the area of the Middle East 
requesting such a id agains t "overt armed aggression from: 
any nat ion cont ro l led by in te rna t iona l communism*'. Through 
t h i s doct r ine Iran became in a p r iv i l eged posi t ion in which 
American pres ident extended i t s funds for mi l i t a ry and economic 
a id in the a r e a . Therefore, United S t a t e s agreed to provide 
increased financing for an already planned large mi l i t a ry 
construct ion program to meet the needs of the Iranian forces* 
and provide cer ta in add i t iona l items of mi l i t a ry equipment. 
Despite endorsement of the Eisenhower doct r ine , Iran 
continued to complain about non-merribership of the United 
S ta tes in the Baghdad Pact and the inadequacy of American 
q 
mil i t a ry and economic a id through the o rgan iza t ion . 
9 . i b id . , pp . 279-80. J 
sa 
Between the mid 1950s and raid 1960s, Shah's regime 
benef i t t ed enoritously from U.S. ecxjnomic a s s i s t a n c e . I t 
helped to advance n a t i o n ' s economy and Shah's hold on power. 
Oi l revenues were increasing and the Iranian economy was 
r e l a t i v e l y robust a t the t ime. Shah bene f i t t ed from U.S. 
technica l and managerial t r a i n i n g . I r a n ' s ambitious 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p ro j ec t s , i t s decreasing a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p roduc t iv i ty and increase in rea l income led to increase in 
imports. I t imported machinery cap i t a l goods, food and 
J 10 consumer goods. 
Shah used the o i l revenues to finance successive econo-
raic development plans for rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . I t s 
spectacular r a t e of economic growth compared favourably 
with tha t of most developing and even some developed countr ies 
during the 1960s, there was v i s i b l e improvement in the 
material standards of l i f e and per capi ta income, 
I r a n ' s commitment to the west and i t s dependence on 
the United S t a t e s had grown deep and strong enough to ensure 
the continuation of i t s r e l a t ionsh ip with the West, In 
10, Ramazani, R.K, The United S t a t e s and Iran, 
(Praeger Publisher , 1982), pp , 59-70. 
196 5 Johnson administration declared Iran as developed country. 
He planned to end American g r an t - i n - a id to i t by November 
1967. The United S t a t e s remained committed to i t s a l l i ance 
vjith Iran and to meet most of Shah's economic and mi l i t a ry 
requests upon cash payment or long-term loan . Through such 
a ids . Shah strengthened h i s posi t ion and could normalize 
r e l a t ion \ji th Soviet Union, I t reduced h i s v u l n e r a b i l i t y 
to American pressures , and counter h i s opponents c r i t i c i s m 
11 tha t he vjas an American Stooge, 
On October 13, 1964 Iranian Majlis granted ex t ra -
t e r r i t o r i a l l ega l s t a t u s for U.S. advisors in I r an , Shah 
accepted the l a s t American militairy mission in 1973, This 
was the Technica-1 Assistance Fie ld Team (TAFT) v?hich became 
necessary a f t e r President Nixon's May 1972 v i s i t to Iran and 
due to increased skyrocketing in U.S. arms sa le to I r a n , 
Shah as the regional surrogate of the United S ta t e s , received 
a l l the weapons i t needed for the defence of the Persian 
Gulf. Shah purchased a huge amoiint of soph i s t i ca ted arms. 
From 1950 to 1970, I r a n ' s mi l i t a ry purchases from United 
S ta t e s alone came to $ 1,3 b i l l i o n . I t increased during 
1 1 . Og,,..,cit,, The Rise and Fa l l of the Shah, p.94 . 
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1971-1978 and add i t iona l anount of $ 18,1 b i l l i o n was spent 
12 
on weapons when Shah got control of the coun t ry ' s income. 
In f i s c a l year 1970 the United S t a t e s de l ivered to 
Iran 189,7 mil l ion d o l l a r s in foreign m i l i t a r y sa les , and 
in f i s c a l year 1971, 114,3 million d o l l a r s . I t -was an 
indicat ion of the s ize was given by Secre tary of S t a i e 
Rogers, who reported tha t in f i s c a l year 1971 a t o t a l of 
$ 295,8 mil l ion in Export Import bank loans was extended to 
Iran to a s s i s t in purchasing both mi l i t a ry and commercial 
equipment and serv ices in the United S t a t e s , In Febiruary 1973 
Iran contracted with the Pentagon to purchase 2 b i l l i o n . 
c3ollars worth of arms in the next f ive y e a r s . This agreement 
was the l a t e s t in a rapid and sustained bui ld-up of I r a n ' s 
armed forces since 1969, which has been undertaken with the 
fu l l support of both Washington and London. Iran had a 
mobile f l e e t with four u l t r a rapid f r i g a t e s with sea - to -
surface miss i l e s , three r e f i t t e d U.S. des t royers , the l a rges t 
f l e e t of fast-moving Hovecraft a squadron of mine-sweepers 
and i t could purchase the Israel-made sh ip - to - sh ip Gabriel 
12, Op, c i t , . Middle East Past and Present , p , 438. 
102 
m i s s i l e . In addi t ion i t possessed over 50 Phantom a i r -
craf t and expects to purchase four more squadrons as well 
as he l i cop te r qunships. 
The 1976 budget sought to increase t o t a l expenditure 
by 27 per cent to $ 44,7 b i l l i o n . The Shah had determined 
to press ahead vjith mi l i t a ry spending. Instead of paying 
in cash or aga ins t c red i t , he sought to b a r t e r crude o i l . 
In April 1976 three-cornered discussion were i n i t i a t e d with 
o i l companies and arms supp l i e r s . Two deals were proposed: 
(1) the purchase of upto 300 F- l6s from Mc Donnel Douglas 
and 4 spruance c l a s s des t royers from Lyston Indus t r i e s to be 
acquired v ia the sa le of 300,000 b a r r e l s per day of crude 
by Nice to be marketed to two American o i l companies, 
Ashland and England Petroleum ; (2) the purchase of tracked 
Rapier mi s s i l e s worth £ 400 million from B r i t i s h Aircraf t 
corporation (BAG) v i a the sale of 16,000 b a r r e l s per day 
of crude to be marketed by She l l . 
Subsequently b a r t e r was used outs ide the mil i tary ' 
sector and the re was scarcely a large cont rac t for which 
payment was not considered on t h i s b a s i s . The Iranian 
13, Zubih, Chubin. The Foreign Rela t ions of Iran -
^ Developing S ta te in"a 2one""of Great^Power Confl ic t , 
Tuniversxty oT CalTlornTa Press , 1974"), pp.""2'58-9 . 
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t a c t i c vjas to keep b a r t e r as an option ava i l ab le when 
convenient. Since such deals were highly conplicated to 
arrange foreign suppl ie rs v?ere genera l ly r e luc tan t to accept 
them. The f i r s t b a r t e r contract was with BAC^  concluded on 
18 Moverriber 1976, The bas ic problem for the I ran ians was 
tha t some from of discount had to be included in the sa le 
of the crude and the deals were very time-consuming, 
espec ia l ly where more than one suppl ier was concerned in 
single c o n t r a c t . 
The emphasis on b a r t e r served to under l ine a growing 
sense of unease among the technocrats over the way the 
revised plan had developed. In July 1976 a c r i t i c a l report 
from the PEO c i r c u l a t e d to min i s t r i e s and government agencies 
I t pointed out b lun t ly tha t ag r i cu l tu re was being ignored, 
tha t production and labour cos ts had r isen so f a s t in the 
past three years as so jeopardise the future of Iranian 
non-oi l exports , and tha t the bot t lenecks had been inef fec-
tua l ly t ack led . The conclusion was slower grovjth and t i g h t e r 
control on government spending . This document was never 
publ ished, 
October 1976 Shah denounced the euphoria tha t 
had been generated by the 19 73 o i l pr ice r i s e s . The e d i t o r 
of Kayhan, Amir Taheri expected a rout ine bi r thday interview 
104 
Instead i t turned into a lengthy a u t o - c r i t i q u e of the past 
three y e a r s . I ran ians had been l iv ing in a f o o l ' s paradise 
vma^are tha t there was a de f in i t e and r e l a t i v e l y short 
t imescale for the duration of o i l money. Oi l alone had 
been responsible for the subsidies , the lov? taxes , the 
i n i t i a t i o n of welfare, the sudden heap in l iv ing s tandards . 
Unless people mere prepared to work harder, produce more 
and buy higher taxes these would be nothing to replace o i l , 
he sa id . 
"We have not demanded s e l f - s a c r i f i c e from people: 
ra ther we have covered them in soft cotton wool. Things 
wi l l now change. Everyone should work harder and be 
orepared for s ac r i f i c e s in the service of the na t ions 
progress ; he said grimly. This was almost exact ly the 
opposite of what he had t o l d the nat ion a t Ramsan in 
August 1979. compare what he said then: 'we do not expect 
I ranians to t ighten t h e i r b e l t s , eat l e s s and labour away 
for the promised heaven which i s put of by a year every-
day. We t r y to often the nation the welfare and case we 
14 have promised — today" . 
14, I r an . The I l lus ion of Power, pp . 101-103. 
.03 
I r a n ' s non-oi l t rade with the United S t a t e s was not 
always advantageous. But in 1970s I r a n ' s airibitious 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p ro j ec t s , preference for U.S. commodities 
and serv ices decreasing a g r i c u l t u r a l p roduc t iv i ty and i t s 
r i s ing r ea l income increased the imports of machinery^ 
cap i t a l goods, food and consumer goods e t c . In sp i t e of 
attempts a t d ive r s i f i ca t i on of t rade . United S t a t e s a t t a ined 
the rank of a major t rade par tner , genera l ly a f t e r VIest 
Germany and Japan and re ta ined i t x int i l l the f a l l of Shah's 
15 
regiine an 1979. 
Iran used to maintain i t s importance in the regipn. 
The main i n t e r e s t of America v?as to maintain the s t a b i l i t y 
in the region. I t would f u l f i l the American v i t a l i n t e r e s t 
in the Persian Gulf, Even though Americans were c r i t i c i z e d 
for t h e i r Iranian secur i ty r o l e . The depth of U.s , 
involvement in I r a n ' s m i l i t a r y — i n d u s t r i a l development 
programme was indicated by the presence of 24,000 Americans 
in Iran and was to r i s e to 50,000 by the 1980. I t 
15* Op* c i t , . The United S ta t e s and I r a n . 
projec ted tvo-way t rade , inclus ive of o i l but exclusive 
of mi l i t a ry purchase of $ 40 b i l l i o n during 1976-80. 
Shah's regime f e l l dovjn in 1979 and i t could not mater ia l ized 
as aimed. 
Shah's regime required more than tvjenty years to 
achieve Iranian ownership and control of I r a n ' s p o t e n t i a l 
as an o i l pover. The regime's progress in t h i s respect 
corresponded with i t s emergence from a pos i t ion of heavy 
dependence on the United S t a t e s and in t e rna t iona l o i l 
companies in the 1950s to a pos i t ion from which i t could 
conduct i t s domestic and foreign a f f a i r s with more f l e x i b i l i t y 
but in convergence with the i n t e r e s t s of the west, in the 
second half of the 1960s. The major fac tor in helping 
the regime to achieve t h i s s t a tu re was the Shah's White 
Revolution, which aimed a t mobilizing the masses and cent ra-
l i z ing p o l i t i c a l power in support of the Shah's r u l e . The 
White Revolution created a degree of economic and p o l i t i c a l 
s t a b i l i t y in Iran tha t strengthened the Shah* s hand in the 
conduct of I r a n ' s foreign r e l a t i o n s . The Shah's regime was 
thus r e l a t i v e l y successful in developing f r iendly and 
16. Op. c i t , . Twentieth Century Iran, p . 212. 
J 
107 
cooperative r e l a t i o n s with a l l i t s regional neighbours 
except Iraq . But in both t h i s and i t s drive to 
maximize I r a n ' s bene f i t s from i t s o i l resources the regime 
was immensely aided by the changes in regional and i n t e r -
na t iona l s i t u a t i o n s including the formation and ac t iva t ion 
of OPEC as an e f fec t ive ca r t e l / and the two Middle East 
vjars of 196 7 and 1973 and t h e i r consequences, which the regime 
s k i l f u l l y exploi ted in order to achieve i t s own o i l pol icy 
ob j ec t i ve s . 
The r ea l i za t ion of I r a n ' s o i l p o t e n t i a l in the 
i n t e r e s t s of the covmtry brought the Shah's regime not only 
enormous and unprecedented wealth, but a l so diplomatic 
s t rength, with increasing influence in regional and world 
p o l i t i c s . I t could not escape the fact t ha t i t was deeply 
contfPitted to the West, however, and i t could act only within 
the l i m i t s set by t h i s commitment. I t s new power never the-
l e s s gave the regime strong leverage in i t s r e l a t i onsh ip 
with the outs ide world, p a r t i c u l a r l y the West, which suddenly 
foxond i t s e l f more dependent than ever before on Iranian 
o i l and for the matter on Iranian o i l money xinder the control 
of the Shah's regime. The c a p i t a l i s t count r ies , more than 
103 
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any o t h e r s , found i t n e c e s s a r y to acknovjledge t h e 
i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n of the S h a h ' s regime, and s e t ou t 
to win i t s favour in whatever way p o s s i b l e in o r d e r 
to r e c y c l e t o t h e West t he noney t h a t had been t r a n s -
f e r r e d to I r an a s a r e s u l t of t h e o i l p r i c e i n c r e a s e 
The Shah, in t u r n , demanded i n c r e a s i n g he lp from t h e 
west in ach iev ing h i s b r o a d e r goa l of t r ans fo rming I r an 
i n t o a c a p i t a l i s t - o r i e n t e d s e l f - g e n e r a t i n g economic 
and m i l i t a r y pov?er be fo r e t h e c o u n t r y ' s e x p o r t a b l e ' 
o i l ran o u t . 
Mohammad Reza Shah in h i s au tob iography wrote , 
t h a t he d i d no t draw up t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y p o s i t i v e 
ba lance shee t d e a l i n g wi th the l a s t " t w e n t y - f i v e y e a r s 
in I r a n . I t was done by the Uni ted LM a t i o n s . In d i v e r s e 
f i e l d s of p o l i t i c s educa t ion , s o c i a l we l f a r e and 
development we a r e ahead of a l l deve loping c o u n t r i e s . 
In 1975 annual growth r a t e reached 42% in c u r r e n t 
p r i c e s t h a t was four t imes t h e growth r a t e in J a p a n . 
1'7« Op. c i t . . The Rise and F a l l of t h e Shah, p p . 130-3; . , 
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s t a t i s t i c s produced by the o rgan isa t ions deporading on the 
United Nations es tab l i shed tha t the annual r a t e of economic 
development in Iran since the beginning of the White 
Revolution was 13%, In twenty-five years the average yearly 
wage rose from l e s s than 160 d o l l a r s per cap i ta to 2,200 
by the beginning of 1978, i f United Nations are to be 
18 bel ieved and t o 2540 d o l l a r s according to our f i gu re s . 
I t seems tha t during the p re - revo lu t ionary period 
and even during revolut ion, the oo\Mntry was fu l ly paralysed 
by the super powers in a l l r e s p e c t s . The foreign pol icy 
of Iran suffered a heavy l o s s . In a l l spheres of econoiQic 
development the re has been an i n s t a b i l i t y , whether indus-
t r i a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l o r any o ther Sec tor . I t i s . impor tant to 
note tha t Iran has a very good g e o - p o l i t i c a l s igni f icance in 
a l l r e s p e c t s . I t could become a leading power in the Asian 
continent but due to superpowers' involvement by t h i s could 
not be achieved. 
18. Pahlavi . M.R. The Shah's Story (Michael Joseph, 
London 1980), p . 150T 
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CONCLUSION 
Geopolity and the vast o i l resources make Iran the 
focus of vjorld a t t e n t i o n . Throughout the h i s t o r y Iran 
always caught a t t en t ion of b ig powers and remained bone 
of contention amangst them; i t i s proved t h a t Iran had 
great values for United Kingdom as i t used to communicate 
and t ranspor t across the region to i t s eas tern co lon ies . 
For t h i s region, Bilshehr . was the off ice of the B r i t i s h 
P o l i t i c a l Resident xander whom many p o l i t i c a l agents were 
responsible for individual smaller s t a t e s . F ina l ly the 
p o l i t i c a l res ident was answerable to the viceroy in Ind ia . 
In t h i s way, Pe r s i a ( I r a n ' s o ld name) was of immense impor-
tance for B r i t i s h e r s t ha t they could manage to control . ^ 
the e n t i r e region» Since the discovery of o i l in t h i s 
region and f i r s t explorat ion near Masjid-e-Sulaiman in 
Pers ia in 1908, was the foremost success of B r i t i s h through 
t h e i r o i l company Anglo-Iranian o i l Company (AIOC) , VJith the 
upstream of o i l , Pe r s i a had become the cen t r a l f igure of 
world a t t en t ion as i t gave indica t ions of o i l prospects in 
the region. With the passage of time, the importance of 
the region and Iran enhanced. 
12 
The development of the economy and the progress of 
the coxontry a t f a s t e r pace could be made poss ib le a f t e r 
1941 vhen king Mohammad Reza Shah took over and inc l ined 
towards west and s t a r t e d improving r e l a t i o n s with them. 
P r io r to the vrarld war 11/ Iran was c lose ly assoc ia ted with 
Germany but theiwar second divided the world in to two 
main groups, one led by USAlother led by USSR. USA had a 
grea te r influence on I r an , Shah's l i b e r a l ideology and 
increasing des i re for quick nodemizat ion in the coxintry 
led Iran to inclina towards West, Shah had a lso made 
e f fo r t s to e s t a b l i s h f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with neighbouring 
giant Russia hoping tha t i t would b o l s t e r in reducing 
the tension of opposition of Tudeh par ty which had a 
strong Russian backing. But he could achieve belovj h i s 
expec ta t ions . Establishment of Esfahan s t e a l mi l l seems 
to be an example of Russian col leborat ion and h e l p . Shah's 
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i nc l ina t ion towards America was not because of only 
economic support but for the secur i ty of the nat ion and 
h i s ovonself. America open handedly provided Iran with 
sophis t ica ted war machinery. The urgent need of o i l 
as a main source of energy for the rebui lding of sha t te red 
economies of western i n d u s t r i a l countr ies pushed them 
to turn t h e i r a t t en t i on towards o i l producing n a t i o n s . 
The o i l r ich countr ies got a massive technological 
and mi l i t a ry help from the western c o u n t r i e s . The main 
a t t r a c t i o n of the west was to prevent Iran from Russian 
expansion and wipe out • • ~ influence and make some 
economic ga in . For a l l these^- America as a leader 
of western block, began foot holding in Iran as t h e i r base 
to command over the e n t i r e region, Iran had to be made 
not only s t r a t e g i c a l l y strong but technologically/^':. 
as well^boost up i t s economy. The change in the society 
was a necessary phenomenon which could be made poss ib le 
through spreading influence of western c u l t u r e . Shah of 
Iran, in h i s o\«i opinion, was on r igh t pa th as he wanted 
the country changed overn ight . So he planned h i s p o l i c i e s 
accordingly which were pro-west . The fana t i c r e l i g i o u s 
groups observed a fas t change of t h e i r cu l tu re and the 
y 
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country s l ipping out of t h e i r hands. They foxond no o ther 
way out of i t except cooking revolut ionary process ins ide 
with the passage of tiine, jEhe sudden outburs t of revolut ion 
was observed in 1979 and the r e l i g ious group led by 
Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the supreme power in the 
covin t r y . 
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